Have You Hedged Today?  The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives by Jackson, Carolyn H.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 67 Issue 6 Article 10 
1999 
Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer 
Derivatives 
Carolyn H. Jackson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carolyn H. Jackson, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 
Fordham L. Rev. 3205 (1999). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives 
Cover Page Footnote 
The author wishes to thank Kenneth Raisler, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Professor Donna Redel, 
Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law, for their helpful guidance and comments. Any 
errors or omissions are exclusively those of the author. This Note is dedicated to Sanjay R. Sathe—thank 
you. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/10 
HAVE YOU HEDGED TODAY?
THE INEVITABLE ADVENT OF
CONSUMER DERIVATIVES
Carolyn H. Jackson*
The long history of finance is cluttered with stories of fortunes lost
on big bets. No one needed derivatives in order to go broke in a
hurry. No one need go broke any faster just because derivatives
have become a widely used financial instrument in our times. The
instrument is the messenger; the investor is the message.'
INTRODUCTION
During your hectic rush-hour drive to work, you contemplate the
good news-your daughter has been accepted to the college of her
dreams. Simultaneously, you reflect on the down side, namely, the
substantial tuition payments are going to dramatically increase your
fixed monthly payments. Nagging at the back of your mind are the
financial news reports cautioning that interest rates might rise to the
double-digit levels of the 1970s and early 1980s due to the current
over-heated inflationary economy.
Given the considerable increase in your monthly fixed payments,
you realize that your thirty-year variable rate mortgage is just too
risky. A fixed rate mortgage would provide you wvith greater financial
certainty and insulate you from any increase in interest rates. Pre-
paying your existing mortgage and re-negotiating a new variable rate
mortgage, however, could take months, and would inevitably be time
consuming and stress inducing.
As you take the exit off the highway that leads to your office, you
pass an ATM facility of the bank that provided your mortgage. You
recall that at the same time you had signed the mortgage agreement,
you signed another agreement with the bank-a swap agreement.
You stop at the ATM machine. After entering your card and pass-
word, you touch the screen entitled "swap contract." You then select
the mortgage screen. It tells you that you could currently convert
your variable rate interest payments on your mortgage to a fixed rate
of six percent. You punch, "YES." That's it-no bank meetings, no
new mortgage agreements, no time delays, no missed market opportu-
nities. In a matter of seconds, your swap agreement has allowed you
* The author wishes to thank Kenneth Raisler, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell,
and Professor Donna Redel, Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law,
for their helpful guidance and comments. Any errors or omissions are exclusively
those of the author. This Note is dedicated to Sanjay R. Sathe-thank you.
1. Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 326
(1996).
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to alter your mortgage interest payments to a structure that best suits
your current financial needs.
The above hypothetical is by no means far-fetched. Over the past
two decades, privately negotiated derivatives (swaps) have revolution-
ized how financial institutions and corporations evaluate, quantify,
and manage risk.2 Access to new funding and investment markets,
lower borrowing costs, increased investment yields, and low-cost, flex-
ible asset liability management are among the myriad purported bene-
fits of swaps.3 Everyone, it seems, is on the derivatives bandwagon.
Everyone, that is, except for consumers.
Despite the seemingly endless financial advantages of derivatives,
to date only a very limited and sporadic retail derivatives market ex-
ists.4 Some retail participation is direct, such as a consumer entering
into a mortgage with a periodic cap.5 Most retail participation, how-
ever, is indirect, such as a consumer investing in a hedge fund that
utilizes derivatives to manage the portfolio or in the shares of a corpo-
ration that engages in derivatives.6 Individuals are not utilizing deriv-
atives in managing their financial activities on a daily basis. If
derivatives are indeed invaluable as a risk management tool for corpo-
rations,7 they should be equally invaluable for ordinary consumers.
2. See Robert M. McLaughlin, Over-the-Counter Derivative Products: A Guide
to Business and Legal Risk Management and Documentation 1 (1998) (commenting
on the forces that moved derivatives markets to the "forefront of the world economic
scene"); Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine
Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 Loy. Chi. L.J. 527, 530 (1998) (discuss-
ing derivatives, "predominant role in the financial markets"). Derivative transactions
fall broadly into three segments: (1) privately negotiated derivatives between two
arms-length participants; (2) derivatives traded on an organized exchange, i.e., fu-
tures; and (3) derivatives that are embedded in a capital raising security. The scope of
this Note is limited to privately negotiated derivatives. For an overview of the seg-
mentation of derivatives transactions into these three broad categories, see Christo-
pher L. Culp Competitive Enter. Inst., A Primer on Derivatives: Their Mechanics,
Uses, Risks, and Regulation, 3-30 (1995) [hereinafter Culp, Primer on Derivatives].
See also infra notes 41-84 and accompanying text (discussing the various derivative
products within the three categories).
3. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 40-42.
4. See id. at 81-82 (discussing the absence of "widows and orphans" in what is
generally regarded as a wholesale market); Ronald H. Filler, 7vo-Tiered Regulation,
Futures Industry, Feb./Mar. 1999, at 1, 21 (stating that retail comprises a "very small
part" of the industry); Gibson, supra note 2, at 539 (categorizing derivatives players as
either dealers, consisting of banks, securities firms and other financial institutions, and
end-users, consisting of sophisticated institutions such as corporations and govern-
ment entities).
5. See George Crawford & Bidyut Sen, Derivatives for Decision Makers 197-98
(1996).
6. See id.
7. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 41. Derivatives enable firms
to manage the risks of anticipated expansion by increasing the certainty of the firm's
net cash flow. See id. Derivatives provide an efficient method for corporations to
manage their interest rate and currency risk. See id.
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The primary reason for the current amount of retail swap activity is
low is regulatory, i.e., the regulatory uncertainty concerning privately
negotiated derivatives has led to a stalemate between United States
regulators and derivative dealers.8 Regulatory authorities such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") have insinuated that their ju-
risdictional authority to regulate consumer activity in securities and
futures may extend to any consumer activity in privately negotiated
derivatives.9 Swap dealers, to maintain their current favorable regula-
tory environment, are willing to at least entertain the idea that the
SEC and CFTC do have such authority.1"
Retail derivative activity is inevitable. Just as swaps have evolved
across different currency markets and different underlying indexes,
such as commodity and equity," so too will the product evolve from
an almost exclusive institutional activity to include retail activity. Cost
is no longer a prohibitive factor due to the acceptance and advance-
ment of electronic funds transfers and the Internet.12 The risk man-
agement benefits of derivatives are too substantial to be kept from
consumers.
The question that underscores the future of retail derivative activity
is how, if at all, it should be regulated. One possible answer is that the
current regulatory structure that focuses on institutional regulation is
adequate. Another response is that a product regulator such as the
SEC, CFTC, or even a yet-to-be-formed derivatives agency may be
necessary to protect consumers from fraud and other deceptive mar-
8. See generally Christopher L. Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction,
Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Economics of Derivatives Regulation, in Derivatives
Handbook: Risk Management and Control 458, 486-87 (Robert J. Schwartz & Clif-
ford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Culp, Functional and Institutional Interac-
tion] (discussing the regulatory uncertainty for privately negotiated derivatives, as no
bright line exclusions exist to definitively place the transactions outside of the regula-
tory jurisdiction of the securities or commodities laws). Culp asserts that both the
regulators and even swap dealers themselves due to their own self-interest, actually
promote this uncertainty. See id. at 486-87.
9. See id. at 481-86.
10. See infra Part III.B.2.
11. See Kenneth R. Kapner & John F. Marshall, The Swaps Handbook: Swaps
and Related Risk Management Instruments 288-89 (1990). Commodity swaps are
similar in structure to interest rate swaps. One counterparty to the swap makes pay-
ments at a fixed price for a commodity, in return for receiving payments at a variable
price of the commodity. The transaction is cash settled, i.e., there is no exchange of
the physical commodity. The Chase Manhattan Bank pioneered the first commodity
swap in 1986. See id.; see also Tanya Styblo Beder, Equity Derivatives for Investors, in
Advanced Strategies in Financial Risk Management 223, 223-39 (Robert J. Schwartz
& Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1993) (discussing the evolution and applications of eq-
uity swaps). In a common form of an equity swap, one counterparty makes future
payments based on an equity index in exchange for receiving future payments in ref-
erence to another index, such as a fixed interest rate. See id. at 236-38.
12. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 198.
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ket practices. Increased regulation, however, could increase transac-
tion costs, perhaps driving the derivatives market offshore.
This Note addresses the need for regulation of the evolving retail
derivatives market. Part I presents the mechanics of swap transac-
tions. Part II discusses the regulatory jurisdictions of the SEC and the
CFTC. Part III analyzes the reasons for the current lack of retail swap
activity. Part IV discusses the applicability of the securities and com-
modities laws to retail swaps. Part V presents arguments against in-
creased regulation of swaps, even if swaps do indeed extend to retail.
This Note concludes that further regulation of retail derivatives is un-
necessary. The existing regulatory structure has led to the United
States' premiere market position. 13
I. THE MECHANICS OF SWAPS
The fundamental principle of exchange behind swap transactions is
quite simple. Even young children on the playground, as they swap
items in their lunchbox for those of a friend, demonstrate they under-
stand the principle of exchange. A swap, in its most basic form, is
simply an exchange of cashflows. 14 Unfortunately, the press, in their
zealousness to portray swaps as "a kind of financial cyberspace" based
on "calculations designed and monitored by computer wizards using
abstruse mathematical formulas that even their bosses at major trad-
ing houses do not really understand," have obscured this simplicity. 5
As one scholar puts it, swaps are frequently viewed as "science run
amok,... a financial Jurassic Park."' 6
A swap is a bilateral contract between two parties (counterpar-
ties) 17 to exchange or swap defined cashflows at specified intervals,
The cashflows can be determined in reference to an interest rate, for-
eign currency, equity or an equity index, commodity, etc. The most
frequently transacted swap is the interest rate swap, in which cash-
13. See Philip McBride Johnson, Relying on Consumer Protection Laws, Futures
Industry, Feb./Mar. 1999, at 18,20 (stating that, "The United States cannot risk losing
its pre-eminence as a financial center simply to make work for the CFTC.").
14. See Satyajit Das, Swap Financing-Interest Rate and Currency Swaps, LTFX,
FRAs, Caps, Floors and Collars: Structures, Pricing, Applications and Markets 17
(1989) [hereinafter Das, Swap Financing].
15. John Greenwald, The Secret Money Machine, Time, Apr. 11, 1994, at 28, 30.
One reporter has admitted that a financial product, "if it's complex,... [is] apt to get
the name [derivative]." Carol J. Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, Fortune,
Mar. 20, 1995, at 50, 54.
16. Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985, 989 (1995) [hereinafter Hedg-
ing Expectations].
17. See Ravi E. Dattatreya et al., Interest Rate & Currency Swaps: The Markets,
Products and Applications 12 (1994).
18. See id. at 1.
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flows are determined in reference to two different interest rates. 19
The most simple of these, a "plain vanilla" or "fixed-for-floating"
swap,2° involves the exchange of cashflows determined in reference to
a fixed rate of interest for cashflows determined in reference to a
floating rate of interest.
21
A specific application of an interest rate swap provides the best in-
sight into its mechanics. Corporation A has a loan at a fixed rate of
interest. The firm believes interest rates will fall, and would rather
have the interest payments on its loan pegged to a floating interest
rate. The floating interest rate payments will enable Corporation A to
reduce its future borrowing costs if indeed it is correct and interest
rates fall over the life of the loan. Corporation B has a loan at a float-
ing rate of interest. This corporation, in contrast to Corporation A,
believes future floating interest rates will rise, and thus would rather
lock in its future interest payments at a known fixed rate.22
Corporation A could achieve its interest rate objectives by first pre-
paying its existing fixed rate loan and then entering into a new floating
rate loan agreement. Similarly, Corporation B could achieve its inter-
est rate objectives by first prepaying its existing floating rate loan and
then entering into a new fixed rate loan agreement. The prepayment
of debt and the negotiation of a new loan agreement, however, can
involve substantial transaction costs and take considerable time, at
which point the market may have moved unfavorably against the cor-
porations. On the other hand, an interest rate swap allows each cor-
poration to achieve its financial objectives while leaving the existing
loan agreements in place.23 Under the terms of the swap contract,
Corporation A agrees to pay to Corporation B interest at the floating
rate that exists on B's floating rate loan. In return, Corporation B
agrees to pay to Corporation A interest at the fixed rate of interest
that exists on A's fixed rate loan. The swap agreement, through a
separate legal contract, transforms each corporation's net interest pay-
ments, leaving the initial loan agreements intact, thereby lowering
transaction costs and execution time.
24
19. See Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivatives Use:
Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 12, on file with the' Fordham Law Review).
20. See id. (manuscript at 12).
21. See id. (manuscript at 12).
22. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 31-32.
23. See id. at 216-21.
24. See id. at 33. The swap is a legal contract completely independent of the un-
derlying borrowing agreements of Corporations A and B. The institutions that pro-
vided the original loans to Corporations A and B are not parties to the swap.
Corporations A and B, despite entering into the swap agreement, continue to be obli-
gated to their distinct institutional lender for the payment of the principal and inter-
est. The lenders may even be unaware of the swap contract between Corporations A
and B. See id.
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In the same manner that an interest rate swap can transform inter-
est payments from fixed to variable payments or vice versa, a currency
swap transforms currency payments from one currency to another.'
Although the volume of outstanding interest rate swaps dwarfs the
volume of currency swaps,26 the currency swap actually evolved first.27
The concept of currency swaps originated from the sterling and
United States dollar parallel loans arranged between British and
American entities in the 1970s.21 The loans evolved as a method of
avoiding the United Kingdom's foreign exchange controls that had
been implemented to deter the outflow of capital.29 These parallel
loans required that a United States parent corporation have a subsidi-
ary in the United Kingdom in need of local funds and, simultaneously,
that a United Kingdom parent corporation also have a subsidiary in
the United States in need of local funds.30 Two loans were actually
involved in the parallel loan.3' Under the terms of the first loan, the
United States parent corporation would lend the funds it has raised in
the United States dollar market to the United Kingdom subsidiary.32
Under the terms of the second loan, the United Kingdom parent firm
would lend an equivalent amount of pound sterling it has raised in its
domestic market to the United States subsidiary.3 As a result of this
arrangement, the British and American parent corporations were able
to indirectly access the other country's capital market to fund their
overseas subsidiaries, circumventing the foreign exchange controls.34
Currency swaps are similar in structure to parallel loans,35 with one
exception-the counterparties do not lend currencies to each other.36
Under a currency swap, the two currencies are not loaned, but are
exchanged with a simultaneous commitment to reverse the exchange
of currencies at the maturity date of the transaction.37 The currency
amounts to be exchanged, both at inception and maturity, are deter-
mined by the spot-exchange rate set at the time of execution of the
25. See Dattatreya, supra note 17, at 47.
26. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Summary of Mar-
ket Survey Statistics: 1997 Year End. The survey reports that at the end of 1997, the
notional principal amount of interest rate swaps outstanding was approximately $22
billion, in contrast to $1.8 billion of currency swaps. See id.
27. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 5-6.
28. See id.
29. See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 11, at 6.
30. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their
Regulation, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1, 49 (1996).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See 1 Satyajit Das, Swaps & Financial Derivatives: The Global Reference to
Products, Pricing, Applications and Markets 66 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Das, Global
Reference].
36. See id.
37. See id.
[Vol. 673210
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swap. 8 In addition to the initial and final exchanges of principal, the
currency swap involves interest payments.3 9 The interest payments
can be based on a floating or fixed rate basis.40
Interest rate and currency swaps fall under the broader umbrella
term "derivative."'" A derivative is conventionally defined as a finan-
cial instrument or bilateral contract that "derives" its value from the
changes in value of other financial instruments or underlying refer-
ence price, rate, or index.42 Derivatives can be classified into three
broad categories: derivative securities, exchange-traded derivatives,
and over-the-counter ("OTC") privately negotiated derivatives. 43 A
particular derivative transaction, depending upon which category it
falls, will be labeled as either a security, future, or privately negotiated
contract." The label is tremendously important because it ultimately
determines what regulatory regime governs the derivative
transaction.45
Derivatives, whether a security with an embedded derivative, fu-
tures contract, or privately negotiated contract, are actually either a
forward contract, option contract, or a combination of both.4 6 Deriva-
tive transactions that are constructed from forwards include forward
contracts themselves, swap contracts, exchange-traded futures, and se-
curities with embedded forwards.47 Derivative transactions that are
constructed from options include privately negotiated option con-
tracts, exchange-traded options, and securities with embedded
options.4s
Under the terms of a forward contract, the counterparties deter-
mine a set price, amount, and date in the future at which one
counterparty will buy, and the other will sell, a specific underlying as-
set.49 The forward contract requires actual delivery of the underlying
asset by the seller to the buyer.50 Forward contracts exist for agricul-
tural and physical commodities, currencies (foreign exchange for-
wards), and interest rates.5 A forward contract changes in value as
38. See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 11, at 281.
39. See Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 67.
40. See iUL
41. See Martin Mayer, The Bankers: The Next Generation 289 (1997).
42. See Global Derivatives Study Group, Group of Thirty, Derivatives Practices
and Principles 28 (1993); Adams & Runkle, supra note 19, at 4.
43. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L Rev. 1993,
2000-01 (1995); supra note 2.
44. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 29.
45. See Cohen, supra note 43, at 1994.
46. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 29-30.
47. See id at 29.
48. See id at 29-30.
49. See id at 30.
50. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 19, (manuscript at 6).
51. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 30.
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the underlying asset changes in value.52 The terms of a forward con-
tact are not standardized, but are customized to meet a couterparty's
financial and/or business objectives. 3
The other fundamental derivatives contact, the option contract,
grants its holder the right, but does not obligate him, to buy or sell the
underlying asset (or cash settle) at a specified price, either over a de-
fined time period or on a set date.5 4 The option purchaser can forego
his right of exercise and let the option expire.55 The buyer of an op-
tion benefits as the price of the underlying asset increases, but does
not incur a loss if the price of the underlying asset falls. 6 In contrast
to the buyer of the option, the seller of the option has the obligation
to perform, that is, buy or sell the underlying asset if the option holder
exercises the option.57
Derivative securities can embed forwards, options, or a combina-
tion of the two. 8 An example of a derivative security that contains a
series of foreign exchange forwards is a dual currency bond. 9 A dual
currency bond is a bond that pays interest in one currency and princi-
pal in another.6° For example, a United States dollar/Swiss franc dual
currency bond would pay interest in Swiss francs, but principal in
United States dollars.61 Implicit in this security is a series of Swiss
franc/United States dollar forward foreign exchange contracts. 62 Ex-
amples of derivative securities that contain options are "callable" and
"putable" bonds. 63 A callable bond gives the issuer the right to buy
back the bond from the holder at specific times in the future at a set
price.' 4 The issuer in effect has purchased a call option from the
holder of the bond.65 In contrast, the holder of a putable bond has
purchased a put option from the issuer.6 This put gives the holder the
right to sell the bond back to the issuer at specific times in the future
at a set price.67
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 32.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Charles W. Smithson, A Building Block Approach to Financial Engineer-
ing: An Introduction to Forwards, Futures, Swaps and Options 6 (CIBC Wood Gundy
School of Financial Products, reprinted from Midland Corporate Finance Journal,
Winter 1987).
58. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 29.
59. See id.
60. See 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 453.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 29.
64. See John Hull, Introduction to Futures and Options Markets 342 (1991).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
[Vol. 673212
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A futures contract is similar to a forvard contract in that the buyer
of a futures contract also has the obligation to purchase a specified
asset at a specified price on the contract maturity date.6s Futures con-
tracts, however, are standardized rather than custom-tailored, and can
only be traded on an organized exchange.69 The contracts are stan-
dardized as to quantity and quality of the underlying asset, price fluc-
tuations, delivery terms and specifications, maturity, and payment.70
Because futures are standardized contracts that trade on an exchange,
the parties settle the contracts for the cash value of the contract rather
than an actual transfer of the underlying asset as in a forward con-
tract.7 1 An example of an exchange-traded future is a United States
Treasury bond future traded on the Chicago Board of Trade.'
Futures can be combined with options to create options on futures
contracts. 73 If the option on the futures contract is exercised, the un-
derlying futures contract must be delivered.74 As taking or making
delivery of an actual underlying asset can be inconvenient, the options
on a futures contract as it requires delivery of simply the futures con-
tract itself, is often preferred to a direct option on the underlying.75
An option contract on the United States Treasury bond futures con-
tract is an example of an option on a futures contract. 6
Swaps, which are one form of privately negotiated derivatives, can
be broken down into a series of forward contracts.77 For example,
interest rate swaps involve the exchange of specified cashflows, i.e.,
interest payments, on set forward payment dates.78 Each one of these
68. See Smithson, supra note 57, at 2.
69. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 19, (manuscript at 7).
70. See id. at 8; Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 32.
71. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 19, (manuscript at 8). The law has not given
the term futures contract a precise definition, although one characteristic that is im-
portant to courts is whether the contract is offset or settled for cash rather than taking
actual delivery of the underlying asset. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2,
at 63. This characteristic is the basis for the Forward Contract Exemption under the
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"). See 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(11) (1994) ("The term 'fu-
ture delivery' does not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment
or delivery."); Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 62. This exemption is a
statutory exclusion. See id. There is no precise method for determining which transac-
tions are covered by this exclusion. See id. at 63. There are three characteristics, how-
ever, that will increase the probability that a forward contract is likely to fall under
the exclusion. First, the parties must intend physical transfer of the actual underlying
commodity, i.e., they must actually expect to make or take actual delivery. Second,
the parties must enter into the contracts for "commercial purposes." Finally, in addi-
tion to intending to make or take actual delivery, the parties must also have the abilijY
to make or take delivery. See id.
72. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 29.
73. See Hull, supra note 64, at 264.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 265.
76. See id.
77. See Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 42, at 31.
78. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 70.
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forward future interest payments can be broken down from the swap
into an individual and unique forward contract. 79 Other privately ne-
gotiated derivatives can be option-based rather than forward-based
and include swaptions,8 ° caps,81 floors, 2 collars,83 and other option
products. 4 This Note uses the term "swap" generally to refer to all
privately negotiated derivative instruments whether forward- or op-
tion-based. Most of the analysis of this Note, however, concerns
swaps in the specific sense, as it is anticipated that swaps, rather than
option-based transactions, will comprise the majority of future retail
activity as is currently the case in the institutional market. 85
There is no doubt that swaps currently enjoy a more favorable regu-
latory environment than do their exchange-traded and securities-
linked brethren. Indeed, "[t]here is no market regulator for swaps,
like the SEC for securities or the CFTC for futures, and some swaps
participants are not regulated by the federal government at all."86
Swap participants desperately want to keep this regulatory frame-
work. As one dealer put it, "[i]t is a great environment because it
means greater reliance on market discipline.... [Further i]t provides
additional choices to market participants."87 Part II examines the cur-
rent regulatory framework of swaps.
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
During the early 1980s, swaps avoided regulatory scrutiny."8 The
regulation that did exist was primarily institutional, i.e., regulation of
79. See id.
80. A swaption is an option (the right but not the obligation) to enter into a swap.
The buyer of a swaption can exercise his right, on a set forward date, to enter into a
swap whose terms were known and specified at the time the swaption was transacted.
See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 11, at 519.
81. A cap is a series of forward period cash settled options on an underlying index.
The cap buyer receives a payment (exercises the period option) whenever the under-
lying index exceeds the cap level on an exercise date. See id. at 503.
82. A floor is a series of forward period cash settled options on an underlying
index. The floor buyer receives a payment (exercises the period option) whenever the
underlying index falls below the floor level on an exercise date. See id.
83. A collar is the purchase (sale) of a cap and a simultaneous sale (purchase) of a
floor. See id.
84. See Cohen, supra note 43, at 2001.
85. See International Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, Inc., Summary of Market Sur-
vey Statistics: 1997 Activity. The survey only measures interest rate swap, currency
swap, and interest rate option activity. See id. Other privately negotiated derivative
transactions, such as commodity and equity swaps, are not surveyed due to the signifi-
cantly lower volume of transactions as compared with interest rate and foreign ex-
change derivatives. See id. The survey reports that in 1997, 77% of the surveyed
privately negotiated derivatives executed that year were interest rate swaps; 5% were
currency swaps; and 18% were interest rate options. See id. at 1.
86. Graham Cooper, Uncertainty Mounts for U.S. Swappers, RISK, July 1998, at
20, 23.
87. Id.
88. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1354.
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the financial institutions dealing in derivatives rather than the product
itself. As swap activity grew, however, and began to encompass trans-
actions in reference to commodity and equity indexes, the financial
product regulators, the SEC and the CFTC, began to address whether
they might have regulatory jurisdiction over the activity. This part dis-
cusses the evolution of the existing regulatory framework for swaps
and the growing involvement of the CFTC and SEC.
A. Early Regulatory Structure
After observing IBM execute the first widely publicized currency
swap with World Bank in 1981,89 few, if any, would have predicted
that the volume of privately negotiated derivatives outstanding would
grow to almost $29 trillion in 1997.90 In the early 1980s, most of the
swap activity involved currency swaps that enabled large international
borrowers to engage in capital markets/new issue arbitrage. 91 In a
capital markets/new issue arbitrage transaction, a synthetic liability is
created by combining a new debt issue with a concurrent currency
swap to provide a cost of funds that is less than if the issuer had raised
funds directly in the relevant market.92 Prior to the advent of cur-
rency swaps, corporate and institutional borrowers generally bor-
rowed funds in their domestic market, as they did not want to be
exposed to the risk of unfavorable foreign exchange movements in-
curred if they borrowed abroad.93 Through a currency swap, however,
United States corporations, for example, could borrow funds in an
overseas capital markets, such as Switzerland, and simultaneously
transform the Swiss-franc-denominated debt into a synthetic dollar
obligation at a funding rate well below what they could achieve di-
rectly in United States capital markets.94 Over time, the savings
achievable through capital markets arbitrage greatly declined as swap
activity led to greater market efficiency. 95 Today, capital markets ar-
bitrage activity, although still capable of creating a fleeting moment of
89. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 6.
90. See International Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, ISDA Survey Shows Swaps
Volume Rose 13% to $28.7 Trillion in First Half of 1997; New Business Activity
Climbed 46%, at 1 (unpublished news release, Jan. 12, 1998). To say the least, the
wide-ranging financial applicability of swaps and the tremendous advances in portfo-
lio risk management techniques and computer/systems technology that would enable
high volume activity, were not anticipated. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 67
(discussing the importance of computer sophistication in the growth of derivatives); 1
Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 19-28 (discussing the factors behind the
rapid growth of swaps).
91. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 168.
92. See id. at 183-214.
93. See id. at 168.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 171. It is possible to arbitrage across the different capital market
because the price of capital is not consistent at all times. See id. at 168.
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opportunity, only accounts for a small portion of current
transactions.96
Participants began to realize swaps' strength as an inexpensive and
flexible asset-liability management vehicle. 7 The use of swaps in risk
management has led to their almost exponential growth over the past
decade.9" Corporate treasurers can now easily alter existing fixed-rate
debt into floating-rate debt, at a cost generally lower than that of retir-
ing the existing fixed rate debt and negotiating and executing a new
floating rate borrowing.9
During the early 1980s, swap transactions primarily involved inter-
est rates and foreign currencies, and the product "developed under
negligible regulatory attention."'' " A swap, branded neither as a se-
curity nor a futures contract, was free of the exchange-trading require-
ments of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), 1 1 the registration
requirements of the Securities Laws,"° and the antifraud and an-
timanipulation prohibitions of both.10 3 Because many of the major
swap dealers were commercial banks, however, their swap activity was
subject to federal banking regulations." In addition to examinations
by federal bank regulators, the regulations have both mandated re-
porting and capital requirements. 05 The annual regulatory examina-
tion, although primarily focused on bank practices and policies
regarding risk management, also included a review of swap activity. 10 6
Under the reporting requirements, the banks provided information
concerning their total swap positions as measured by notional amount
and an estimated risk value.' 7 The banks were also required to meet
a specific core capital to total assets leverage ratio.'
96. See 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 629.
97. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 172-73.
98. See Carolyn H. Jackson, Legal Challenges for the Millennium: A Speculation, 7
J. Fin. Engineering 203, 205 (1998).
99. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 172-73.
100. See id. at 540.
101. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1994).
103. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 182.
104. See Romano, supra note 30, at 59.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 59-60.
108. See id. at 61. Prior to 1988, swaps and other off-balance sheet financial instru-
ments were free of bank regulatory capital requirements. In 1988, the Basle Accord
was negotiated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), United States bank-
ing regulators, and banking regulators from many other nations. The Basle Accord
imposed risk-based capital requirements on swaps and other off-balance sheet finan-
cial products. The capital provides a reserve against potential losses that would arise
from a couterparty default (credit risk). The Basle Accord became fully operative in
1992. See id. In 1993, the BIS wrote a proposal that the capital requirements be ex-
tended to include the market risk arising from swap transaction and other off-balance
sheet financial instruments. See id. at 62.
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B. Assertion of CFTC and SEC Regulatory Jurisdiction
In the late 1980s, the swaps world changed dramatically, as the swap
product evolved to include commodity- and equity-linked indexes."
Both the CFTC and the SEC began to obliquely assert that they had
regulatory jurisdiction over some or all of the growing and highly
profitable swap activity.110 For example, in 1987, in response to re-
ported commodity swap activity by The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
(Chase), the CFTC stated that it was analyzing whether it should reg-
ulate commodity swaps."' The CFrC hinted that it might declare
commodity swaps to be illegal, unauthorized, off-exchange futures
contracts. 2 Simultaneously, the CFTC launched an enforcement in-
vestigation of Chase's commodity swap activity.1 13
1. Historical Background of the SEC and CFTC
a. The SEC
Although the issue of a required disclosure system for United States
securities had been debated since the early twentieth century, it was
only after the market collapse in October 1929 and the Great Depres-
sion that there was any true political impetus for congressional ac-
tion." 4 The Federal Securities Act of 1933 ("'33 Act") was enacted to
regulate the offering and sale of securities to the public.1 s Under the
'33 Act, disclosure requirements were created to address the abuses of
the 1920s, including the fraudulent sale of securities." 6 The '33 Act
requires disclosure of the public offering of securities through the pro-
cess of registering the offering. 1 7 The registration statement aims to
provide full and fair disclosure of the particular public offering of se-
curities." 8 The registration statement requires issuers to disclose all
of the significant details of their underlying business.119
The devastating economic effects of the Great Depression extended
beyond the purchasers of new issues. 20 Holders of outstanding secur-
ities suffered severe and painful financial losses.12 1 Although much of
the 1929 stock market crash was due to speculative frenzy, abusive
109. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 154-56, 173-80, and accompanying text.
111. See Romano, supra note 30, at 55.
112. See id.
113. See idl; supra note 11 (describing commodity swaps).
114. See James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 3 (2d ed.
1997).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id at 4.
118. See id.
119. See id
120. See id at 5.
121. See id.
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trading and market manipulation practices played a role as well. 122 In
response to these concerns, Congress passed the Securities Exchange
Act ("'34 Act") to protect the public against abusive stock prac-
tices. 123 The '34 Act created the Securities and Exchange Commission
to enforce compliance with the '33 and '34 Acts.1
24
b. The CFTC
During the early 1800s, United States farmers and agricultural
merchants used futures contracts to protect against price fluctuations
of agricultural commodities. 25 These contracts were established
through informal negotiations between merchants and farmers.
1 26
With time, centralized markets, or exchanges, such as the Chicago
Board of Trade, began to develop. 27 These exchanges offered stan-
dardized contracts for agricultural commodities that could be bought
and sold in the future, replacing the informal negotiations between
merchant and farmer.' 28 But many were opposed to the exchanges'
intense speculative nature. For instance, in 1921, a United States Sen-
ator commented that the Chicago Board of Trade was "so much of a
'gambling hell' that 'Monte Carlo or the Casino at Havana are not to
be compared to it."" 29 Public outcry against the perceived speculative
abuses of both the exchanges and futures activity that was off-ex-
change, such as bucket shops, 3 ' led Congress to enact the Futures
Trading Act' ("FTA") in 1921.132 The FTA sought to halt price ma-
nipulation and bucketing by levying a prohibitive tax on any grain fu-
tures that were off-exchange and therefore not under the supervision
of the Secretary of Agriculture as a "contract market.' 33
The following year, the Supreme Court ruled that a portion of the
FTA was unconstitutional; the tax on off-exchange grain futures trans-
actions represented an improper exercise of Congress's taxing
122. See id. at 5-6.
123. See id. at 6-7.
124. See id. at 7-9.
125. See Thomas A. Tormey, Note, A Derivatives Dilemma: The Treasury Amend-
ment Controversy and the Regulatory Status of Foreign Currency Options, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 2313, 2323 (1997).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 61 (citation omitted).
130. Bucket shops claimed to execute futures transactions for the public. The
bucket shop merchant, however, "bucketed" trades, meaning that he took the cus-
tomer order but did not register them with any board of trade or exchange. Rather, if
the value of the contract fell, he would collect from the customer. If the value of the
contract increased, such that the customer was owed money the bucket shop would
disappear, avoiding paying the customer. See Mayer, supra note 41, at 329.
131. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
132. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2324.
133. See id.
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power.134 Congress responded by enacting the Grain Futures Act of
1922,135 relying on an exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause136 to once again try to prohibit all off-exchange futures
activity.137
During the Great Depression, commodity prices experienced a dev-
astating collapse.' 31 In response to suspicions that the collapse had
been caused by speculative trading on the futures exchanges, Con-
gress substantially revised the Grain Futures Act in 1936 through the
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"). 139 The CEA set regulatory
standards for transactions in certain specified commodities 4 ' as well
as criminal sanctions for commodity price manipulation, either actual
or attempted.' 4'
The CEA remained virtually unchanged for the following thirty-five
years.142 In 1974, however, Congress significantly revised the CEA
("1974 Act")143, primarily in response to increasing public participa-
tion in commodity markets.144 The amendments created the CFTC as
an independent agency, "ostensibly... [in] the desire to expand regu-
latory coverage to then-unregulated futures trading, which included
several contracts on nonagricultural products, such as silver and for-
eign currency futures, as well as internationally grown agricultural
products like coffee and sugar."'1 45 Congress granted the CFTC exclu-
sive jurisdiction over futures contracts on all commodities.'46 In addi-
tion to increasing the number of commodities covered by the CEA,
134. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922).
135. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the author-
ity "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States ... ." Id.
137. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2325. The constitutionality of the Grain Fu-
tures Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1923. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U.S. 1 (1923).
138. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2325-26.
139. Ch. 545,49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994));
see Tormey, supra note 125, at 2325.
140. Commodity Exchange Act, § 3(a) (1936). According to the CEA, "[tlhe word
'commodity' shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain
sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs and Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes)." Id.
141. Commodity Exchange Act, § 9 (1936).
142. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2326.
143. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26, (1994).
144. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2326-27.
145. Romano, supra note 30, at 22. Prior to the 1974 Act, the administration of the
CEA had been overseen by the Secretary of Agriculture. See Tormey, supra note 125,
at 2327.
146. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(i). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The [CFTCI shall have exclusive jurisdiction... with respect to accounts,
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is com-
monly known to the trade as, an "option . . ."), and transactions involving
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market ....
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the 1974 Act broadened the definition of commodity to include "all
other goods and articles ... and all services, rights, and interests in
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
in.' 1 47 This broadened language suggested that in addition to having
complete jurisdiction over agricultural futures, the CFTC would also
have complete jurisdiction over financial futures. 141 The CFTC's reg-
ulatory authority derives from the 1974 Act's requirement that all fu-
tures trading be "conducted on an agency-authorized contract market
or exchange (board of trade)."' 49 According to the 1974 Act, CFTC
approval is required before any futures contract can be traded.' 50
Further, CFTC regulations require any exchange offering a futures
contract be an authorized board of trade. 151 Among the 1974 amend-
ments to the CEA, Congress included the Treasury Amendment15 1 to
provide the Department of Treasury with the assurance that the "large
off-exchange foreign currency market that had developed among vari-
ous commercial banks, multinational corporations, and sophisticated
investors" would be excluded from the CEA. 153
2. Early CFTC and SEC Regulatory Assertion
The swap industry's ongoing regulatory jurisdictional struggles with
the CFTC have, at least according to the CFTC, given the agency reg-
ulatory authority over any future retail swap activity. 5 4 Despite the
147. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(3); see also supra note 140 (providing the original 1936 defini-
tion of commodity).
148. See McLauglin, supra note 2, at 188. Today, transactions in financial futures
dominate the activity of the exchanges-not transactions in agricultural futures. See
Global Derivatives Study, supra note 42, at 32.
149. Romano, supra note 30, at 23.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii). The Treasury Amendment provides:
Nothing in this chapter [the CEA] shall be deemed to govern or in any
way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, se-
curity rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, gov-
ernment securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments,
unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery con-
ducted on a board of trade.
Id. The Treasury Amendment is a statutory exclusion and therefore all transactions
that fall within the Treasury Amendment are not "covered by the CEA at all and thus
are subject neither to the exchange-trading (or contract market) requirements nor to
CEA antifraud and antimanipulation provisions." McLauglin, supra note 2, at 185
(emphasis in original).
153. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2326-28.
154. In a December 1997 address at Fordham Law School, the Honorable Brook-
sley Born, Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, stated:
The Commodity Exchange Act grants the Commission exclusive jurisdic-
tion over futures and commodity options, whether they are traded on-or-off
exchange, and authorizes the Commission to enforce the federal commodi-
ties laws with respect to such instruments. Using powers granted to the
Commission by Congress in 1992, the Commission has exempted certain
over-the-counter transactions primarily between sophisticated traders, from
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existence of the Treasury Amendment, the CFTC has asserted that it
has regulatory jurisdiction over retail activity in both forward and op-
tion foreign currency contracts.' In a 1985 CFTC statutory interpre-
tation, the agency stated that the Treasury Amendment was limited to
transactions between "sophisticated and informed institutions" and
did not extend to "marketing to the general public."1 6
With regard to swap transactions, in 1989 the CFTC backed off
from its view that it had jurisdictional authority over commodity
swaps, and issued a policy statement'5 that provided a safe harbor for
most swaps from CFTC jurisdiction.5 8 The Commission ruled, how-
ever, that "[s]wap transactions eligible for safe harbor treatment may
not be marketed to the public."'159 The banking industry, dissatisfied
with the CFTC's Swap Policy Statement, lobbied Washington for a bill
that would exclude swaps from the CEA.16
The banking industry's lobbying efforts ultimately resulted in an ex-
emption and not an exclusion.' 6' The Futures Trading Practices
Act, 62 effective October 1992, amended the CEA to authorize the
CFTC to grant exemptions from essentially all of the CEA's provi-
many of the regulations and provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act,
including the on-exchange requirement.
Brooksley Born, Keynote address at the Derivatives & Risk Management Symposium
at Fordham University School of Law (1997), reprinted in 66 Fordham L Rev. 761,
761-62 (1997).
155. See Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction, supra note 8, at 479. A for-
eign currency option is an option, the underlying value of which is pegged to the price
of a particular currency. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2316 n.5; see also supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text (discussing options generically).
A currency forward is a forward contract, the underlying value of which is pegged
to the price of a particular currency. As with other forward contracts, the foreign
currency forward is a customized transaction. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2316
n.11; see also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying test (discussing forwards
generically).
156. Joanne T. Medero, The Great Treasury Amendment Debate, Futures Industry,
Mar. 1997, at 19, 19.
157. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694
(1989). Specifically, the Policy Statement provided: "This statement reflects the
Commission's view that at this time most swap transactions, although possessing ele-
ments of futures or options contacts, are not appropriately regulated as such under
the Act and regulations." Id.
158. See Romano, supra note 30, at 55.
159. 54 Fed. Reg. 30,697 (1989).
160. See Romano, supra note 30, at 56.
161. See Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Recent
Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Erdcange Commis-
sion, in The SEC Speaks in 1998, at 469, 529 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Hand-
book Series No. 1037, 1998). An exclusion is preferable over an exemption because it
provides certainty that swaps are excluded from the provisions of the CEA. "[A]n
exemptive approach ... could allow some market participants to argue later that,
because swaps are exempted from the CEA, they are futures; otherwise, no exemp-
tion would have been necessary." Id.
162. Pub. L. No. 102-546 (1992), 106 Stat. 3590, 3629.
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sions.163 In January 1993, the CFTC exercised its new authority, ex-
empting certain types of swaps from most of the requirements of the
CEA, including the exchange-trading requirement, but not from the
antifraud and manipulation provisions of the CEA,' 6 in what has now
become known as the Swaps Exemption. 65 The exemption, however,
is limited to very sophisticated participants. 166
The CFTC recently tried to establish broad regulatory authority
over privately negotiated derivatives in its May 1998 Concept Re-
lease. 167 Although the CFTC claimed that the purpose of the release
was to solicit widespread commentary on the adequacy of the swap
and other exemptions from the CEA, some regarded it as a step to-
ward CFTC swap regulation. 68 The questions asked in the release
"made it clear that the [CFTC] was looking for reasons to justify ex-
tending its regulatory reach to include this market.' 1 69 The Federal
Reserve, SEC, and Treasury have "condemned" the Concept
Release.170
Unlike the CFTC, the SEC's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction
over swaps has been more circumspect. Further, its assertion of au-
thority has largely occurred in relation to its ongoing turf battles with
the CFTC. Following the 1987 stock market break, the jurisdictional
dispute between the SEC and the CFTC intensified,' 71 as each agency
implicated the other in regulatory oversight.' 72 The numerous reports
and studies concerning the appropriate regulatory structure for stock
index futures and other derivative products called into question SEC
and CFTC regulatory jurisdiction over equity swaps.173 A market that
had largely developed outside of regulatory scrutiny found itself at
center stage in the lengthy and ongoing turf battle between the SEC
and CFTC, as well as in the ongoing debate as to whether the United
States financial markets should be regulated functionally, institution-
ally, or through some combination of both approaches. 74
163. 7 U.S.C. § 6(d) (1994); see Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 66.
164. 7 U.S.C. § 6(d); see Romano, supra note 30, at 56.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1996).
166. See id. § 35.1(b)(2). The Swaps Exemption only applies to eligible swaps par-
ticipants. See id.
167. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1998) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 34 & 35).
168. William P. Albrecht, Reforming U.S. Regulatory Structure, Futures Industry,
Feb.[Mar. 1999, at 14, 15.
169. Id.
170. See McLauglin, supra note 2, at 189.
171. See John D. Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/
SEC Consolidation, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 1175, 1190 (1991).
172. Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, in Advanced Strat-
egies in Financial Risk Management, supra note 11, at 439, 442.
173. See id. at 442 n.8.
174. See generally Christopher L. Culp, Competitive Enter. Inst., Regulatory Uncer-
tainty and the Economics of Derivatives Regulation, Financier: ACMT, Dec. 1995, at
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Recently, the SEC, due to what it perceived to be reprehensible
sales practices, asserted regulatory jurisdiction in its enforcement ac-
tion against Bankers Trust Securities Corp. ("Bankers Trust").'" In
its release detailing the enforcement action, the SEC charged Bankers
Trust with violating the securities laws, asserting that certain swap
transactions they had entered into with Gibson Greeting Cards ("Gib-
son") were not swaps but securities as defined under the '33 Act. 176
The SEC provided no specific basis for its finding. 77 In fact, the re-
lease states that the underlying securities upon which the market
value of the Gibson swaps depended, United States government se-
curities and options on those securities, are specifically exempted by
the SEC.'7 8 Although it is unlikely that the SEC's assertion that the
swap transactions were securities would have been upheld in court, 79
Bankers Trust agreed to settle with the SEC paying a civil penalty of
ten million dollars.1 8 Building upon the analysis of the regulatory
structure of swaps discussed in part II, part IlI addresses both current
and future retail swaps activity.
46 [hereinafter Culp, Regulatory Uncertainty] (discussing functional and institutional
regulation and the overlap between the two forms). As articulated by Culp, financial
regulation comes in two types: functional and institutional. See id. at 53. Functional
regulation purports to regulate the economic functions that the financial system pro-
vides, such as capital formation and hedging. See id. at 55. The SEC and the CFTC
are functional regulatory regimes. See id. In contrast, institutional regulation purports
to regulate the institutions that provide financial activities. See id. at 53. Commercial
bank regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency exemplify institutional regula-
tion. See id at 54.
In response to significant losses by corporations and institutional entities allegedly
due to their activity in derivatives, see infra note 435, Congress has debated whether a
functional regulator should be created for all derivative activity. One such proposal
was the Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995,
which called for the establishment of a Federal Derivatives Commission for the pur-
pose of setting oversight standards for financial institutions engaged in derivative
transactions. See H.R. 20, 104th Cong., (1995); Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating
Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative
See to Congressional Action?, 18 Fordham Int'l LJ. 1397, 1438-42 (1995).
Nobel Laureate Merton Miller predicts that proposed efforts to redraw United
States regulatory jurisdictions along logical functional lines would ultimately end in
regulatory dysfunction. See Merton H. Miller, Functional Regulation, in Derivatives
Handbook: Risk Management and Control supra note 8, at 446, 457.
175. See McLauglin, supra note 2, at 183, 239-40.
176. See Gulp, Regulatory Uncertainty, supra note 174, at 63-64.
177. See Romano, supra note 30, at 58. Romano states, "Indeed, the release is
internally incoherent." Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See In re BT Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136; 58 SEC
Docket 1182 (Dec. 22, 1994). The $10 million dollar payment made pursuant to the
SEC order also satisfied Bankers Trust's obligation under a related CFTC opinion
and settlement order. See id. at 1193.
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III. RETAIL SWAPS AcTIvITY
Largely due to the regulatory uncertainty of SEC and CFTC regula-
tory jurisdiction over swaps, retail swap activity, to date, has been
minimal at best. This part discusses an early attempt to establish a
consumer derivative product through a certificate of deposit with an
embedded derivative, a prediction of the future form of retail deriva-
tives, and the reasons behind the current lack of consumer swap
activity.
A. An Early Consumer Derivative: The S&P Indexed CD
In 1986, the treasurer and the officer in charge of new product de-
velopment for the swaps group at Chase 181 designed a derivative prod-
uct that was ideal for those individuals who want to participate in the
equity markets, but ultimately decide not to, because of the potential
loss of their principal."8 The product the two Chase bankers designed
was a certificate of deposit ("CD") that paid interest at a rate based in
part on changes in the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock In-
dex ("S&P Index"). 83 Basically, a consumer would purchase a CD
from Chase by placing his money on deposit.' 4 The interest payable,
rather than being a money market rate, would be a return based either
on the gains of the S&P 500 Index or a Guaranteed Return. 8 5 At the
CD's maturity, the consumer would be credited with interest at either
the S&P Index Return or the Guaranteed Return, whichever was
higher. 8 a If the S&P Index decreased or failed to increase during the
term of the CD, the S&P Index Return was put at zero, and the de-
positor received the Guaranteed Return. 8 7 Regardless of the per-
formance of the S&P Index, the depositor receives full return of his
principal at maturity. 88 Although the S&P CD looks relatively
181. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Decision of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency on the Request by Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., to
Offer the Chase Market Investment Deposit Account 1 (1988) [hereinafter OCC In-
terpretive Letter], available in 1988 WL 282282. In March 1987, Chase began offering
time deposits known as the Market Index Investment deposit which paid interest at a
rate based upon the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock Index (S&P Index).
See id.
182. See Joseph P. Ogden, A Strategic Analysis of Stock Index-Linked CDs, in De-
rivatives, Regulation and Banking 193, 206 (Barry Schachter ed., 1997).
183. See Eugene H. Cantor & Barry Schachter, Indexed Certificates of Deposit, in
Derivatives, Regulation and Banking, supra note 182, at 159, 162. The S&P Index,
which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, consists of an index of 500 stocks of
generally the largest firms that is weighted by market value. See id. at 162 n.5. The
value of the S&P index is determined by comparing the current aggregate market
value of the 500 stocks against a 1940 base index. See id. at 162-63 n.5.
184. See id. at 162-63.
185. See id. at 163. The Guaranteed Return was similar to a fixed interest rate, and
could be set at various levels, such as two percent, four percent, or zero. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
[Vol. 673224
RETAIL DERIVATIVES
straightforward, to make the product available to the consumer,
Chase had to hedge its exposure to the S&P through various hedges
such as futures contracts on the S&P Index. 8 9
One month after Chase launched the S&P Indexed CD, however,
the Investment Company Institute ("ICI") brought suit in the District
Court of the District of Columbia against Chase."' The ICI claimed
that the Chase S&P Indexed CD was a security, placing it outside of
Chase's banking authority under the Glass-Steagall Act.191 The case
was ultimately resolved in Chase's favor in 1995.192
Undeniably, the S&P Indexed CD makes sense: "From 1926 to
1995, returns on stocks have dwarfed all other common asset classes:
the compound annual growth rate on large company stocks was
10.5%, as against... 3.7% for [United States] Treasury Bills." 193 Fur-
ther, the S&P Indexed CD does not seem likely to lead to a high inci-
dence of fraud or large consumer losses. In fact, its purpose is to
reduce risk and the possibility of loss by allowing individuals to invest
in the equity market without risking their principal.'9 Yet, due to
regulatory uncertainty, the innovative S&P Indexed CD was burdened
with litigation that contributed to delayed consumer acceptance.'"
189. For a thorough discussion of the hedging of S&P Indexed CDs see Ogden,
supra note 182, at 194-05, and OCC Interpretive Letter, supra note 181, at 13-21.
190. See OCC Interpretive Letter, supra note 181, at 1. The Investment Company
Institute (ICI) is the American trade association of the investment company industry,
whose membership consists primarily of open-end investment companies. It members
also include closed-end investment companies and unit investment trusts. See John E.
Baumgardner, Jr. & Paul N. Roth, Developments in the Regulation of Offshore Invest-
ment Funds and Other International Investment Vdicles; Developments in Interna-
tional Advice Regulation, 1077 PLI/Corp 303, 339 n.1 (1998).
191. See OCC Interpretive Letter, supra note 181, at 1-2; 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(1994).
192. See Cantor & Schachter, supra note 183, at 162 n.4.
193. Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mu-
tual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 Geo. L. J. 2319,2368-69 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention].
194. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
195. In the ICI's charges against Chase for offering the S&P Indexed CDs, it
stressed that one of the reasons the CD was outside of Chase's banking authority was
due to the fact that Chase used S&P Indexed futures to hedge its position. See OCC
Interpretive Letter, supra note 181, at 13-16. The use of stock-indexed futures is re-
garded by many as one of the main factors behind the stock market crash of October
19, 1987. See Robert J. Barro et al., Black Monday and the Future of Financial Mar-
kets 364 (1989).
Despite its ominous origins, S&P indexed CDs are now offered by many institu-
tions. These institutions include Bankers Trust, Citibank, Republic New York, Merrill
Lynch, Paine Webber, Salomon Brothers, and Warburg and Co. See Ogden, supra
note 182, at 193 & n.1. CDs can have their return tied to indexes other than equity.
Examples include commodity-linked CDs whose returns are keyed to increases in the
price of gold or other commodities, or commodities indexes and bonus CDs whose
return increase when particular events occur, "such as the victory of a particular foot-
ball team in the Superbowl or the occurrence of a prescribed minimum amount of
rainfall or snowfall in the issuing bank's local area." Cantor & Schachter, supra note
183, at 159.
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B. Why Current Consumer Swap Activity Is Minimal
The primary reasons behind the lack of consumer activity are the
regulatory uncertainty and the desire of swap dealers to preserve the
current favorable regulatory structure that exists for swaps, at least at
the wholesale level. Although the extension of swaps to retail partici-
pants was formerly cost prohibitive in the developmental stages of the
product, technological advances have made consumer derivatives
viable.
1. Legal Uncertainty
The term "legal certainty," in the context of swaps, is used to mean
absolute assurance that swaps are unequivocally outside the reach of
both the CFTC and the SEC.'9 6 A finding to the contrary would have
a devastating, "death penalty" effect on the activity by making the
contracts illegal and thus unenforceable.'97 This is because the con-
tracts would violate either the exchange-trading requirement of the
CEA or the registration requirement with the SEC.1 98 Swap
counterparties would have an easy way to walk out on their contrac-
tual financial obligations. 19 9 In addition, a determination that a swap
is a futures contract would necessitate restructuring the contract to
trade on an exchange and would eliminate one of the swap's primary
advantages-its ability to be exactly tailored to a customer's objec-
tives. Finding a swap to be a security, on the other hand, would re-
quire that all swap contracts be registered with the SEC, as well as
subject them to the antifraud provisions of the '33 Act and the '34
Act.2"' Further, bank subsidiaries could be required to register as
broker-dealers with the SEC and thus be subject to the SEC capital
196. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 189.
197. See Roger L. Anderson, The Treasury Department's Role in Regulating the De-
rivatives Marketplace, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 775, 777 (1997).
198. See McLauglin, supra note 2, at 167, 184-85.
199. See Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction, supra note 8, at 463. A
counterparty to a swap has an incentive to walk away from the contract when the
underlying index of the contract has moved against them. See id. Even a swap
counterparty who is using a swap as a hedge and not as a speculation can have the
incentive to walk away from a swap contract that is in a loss position, claiming, for
example, it is an illegal off-exchange futures contract and therefore unenforceable,
allowing him to benefit from a gain on his underlying position. In such a case, by
walking away from the swap contract, the swap counterparty will be left with a wind-
fall gain on his underlying position. See Hull, supra note 64, at 129-32 (discussing a
fundamental principal of hedging that the gains (loss) on a hedge offset the loss
(gains) of the underlying transaction).
200. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 184.
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rules.2° 1 Finally, swap counterparties would have standing to sue the
dealers for fraud under Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act.
It has been alleged that the CFTC purposely fosters an atmosphere
of legal uncertainty." 3 The uncertainty enables them to give lip ser-
vice to managing three fundamental but often incompatible objec-
tives: (1) to take action against after any perpetrators of fraudulent
activity or price manipulation in the financial or commodity markets;
(2) to provide assurance to privately negotiated derivatives that the
product is essentially outside of the CEA; and (3) to reassure that the
exchange-trading requirement will be upheld for futures contracts.2,
Some regulators and most swap dealers advocate that further regu-
lation of privately negotiated derivatives is unnecessary because only
sophisticated institutions enter into swap agreements . 0 5 Sophisti-
cated institutions operate on an arms-length, counterparty basis, and
have the financial acumen and resources to seek recourse through
common law fraud and contract remedies.2 6 Thus, they do not need
the added protection of regulation by the SEC or CFTC. This argu-
ment has always been troublesome because it fails to look to the fu-
ture. It seems peculiar to base a regulatory framework on the
presumption of a static world that will never evolve to include retail.
2. Status Quo Protectionism
At times, it appears that some swap dealers are willing to accept the
CFI'C's assertions of retail jurisdiction and sacrifice any future devel-
opment of retail derivatives product to the authority of the CFTC and
perhaps the SEC, so that the current favorable regulatory treatment
of swaps will be preserved. For example, in an amicus brief on writ
for certiorari in Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission ,27
many leading derivatives-interested trade associations conceded that
"a holding by this Court that the phrase 'transactions in foreign cur-
201. Should a derivative be declared a security, derivative dealers would be re-
quired to register the transactions under the Acts, and be subject to the SEC's net
capital rules as contained in Rule 15c3-1 under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (1997).
202. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 184.
203. See Alton B. Harris, The CFTC and Derivative Products: Purposeful, Anbigu-
ity and Jurisdictional Reach, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1117, 1166 (1996).
204. See id.
205. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 85; supra note 4 and accom-
panying text. Some however, have conceded the possibility that retail derivatives
whether exchange-traded or privately negotiated may develop, but such a develop-
ment in their view should lead to the development of a two-tiered institutional/con-
sumer regulatory structure. See Filler, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that derivatives
regulation should be less stringent for institutional participants); Tormey supra note
125, at 2371-73 (supporting a "safe-harbor of maximum legal certainty for the In-
terbank industry," while supporting CFTC regulation of retail foreign exchange op-
tion activity).
206. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2350-51.
207. 58 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1995).
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rency' includes foreign currency options does not mean that the mass-
marketing of those instruments to the general public will not be sub-
ject to the [Commodity Exchange Act] (CEA). '2 0 8 Dunn is a leading
case in defining the CFTC's regulatory authority over derivatives, spe-
cifically foreign currency options.2 0 9 The defendant asserted that the
CFTC had no authority to bring a cause of action against him because
the Treasury Amendment excluded foreign exchange transactions
from regulation under the CEA.1l ° The Second Circuit found for the
CFTC, holding that an option on foreign currency is not a transaction
in foreign currency until it is exercised. 1 1
It seems unfortunate and premature that so many leading trade as-
sociations were willing to possibly concede defeat on the regulatory
structure of a market that has not yet emerged in order to maintain
the regulatory status quo for the known institutional market. Swap
dealers must become more affirmative in their arguments that the cur-
rent regulatory framework can include future retail activity. If swap
dealers continue to confine their argument against regulation to the
sophistication of institutional players, they forego the opportunity to
structure a swap to meet consumer objectives. Swaps will not be "de-
veloped to be efficient, to meet investors' needs, and to enhance
[United States] competitiveness in the world financial market."2 '
Rather, the question will be whether retail swaps will ever be offered
at all by United States dealers due to the continuing struggle between
the CFTC and the SEC over the scope of each agency's jurisdiction
over new financial products and their concern to protect retail
customers.
3. Fixed Costs of Swap Transactions
In addition to regulatory uncertainty and status quo protectionism,
cost has also been a factor in the curtailing of retail product activity.
A swap is not a one-time transaction; it is a financial risk position that
must be managed over the life of the transaction.213 Thus, swap deal-
208. Amicus Brief for the Foreign Exchange Committee, Dunn v. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997) (No. 95-1181), available in 1996 WL
392512, at *27. The trade associations were The Foreign Exchange Committee, The
New York Clearing House Association, The Futures Industry Association, The Man-
aged Futures Association, and The Public Securities Association. See id., available in
1996 WL 392512, at *1.
209. 58 F.3d 50.
210. See id. at 53.
211. See id. In 1997, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's opinion,
holding that foreign currency options fell under the Treasury Amendment and were
therefore excluded form CFTC jurisdiction. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n., 117 S. Ct. 913, 917 (1997).
212. See Russo, supra note 172, at 439.
213. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1237. An individual swap can
create a large number of cashflows. For example, a swap with a five-year maturity
structured to have semi-annual interest payments will involve 10 settlement payments,
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ers incur substantial fixed costs in managing their businesses. 21 1 These
costs include trading, marketing, hedging, credit, risk management,
operations technology, regulatory, and legal costs. 215
One of the early hurdles to the establishment of the swap product
was actually legal.216 Legal costs of documenting the transactions
were substantial because each time a transaction was executed each
dealer would write and negotiate an entirely new document, establish-
ing new definitional and mechanical terms.217 Over time, the process
of "legal innovation" led to the development of standardized Master
Agreements.218 All transactions with one counterparty were docu-
mented under the Master Agreement.219 Master Agreements revolu-
tionized the legal environment for swaps as they allowed the
transactions between counterparties to be combined as one net expo-
sure rather than as a number of separate exposures.2 0 This "legal
innovation" alleviated the risk that in bankruptcy a trustee would only
recognize the swap transactions under which the defaulting
couterparty was owed a payment while ignoring those under which it
was required to make a payment.' These standard contracts are
known as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.
10 resets to determine the appropriate floating cashflows, and 10 calculations of the
net settlement amount. See id. at 1237-38.
214. See Robert M. Mark, Risk Oversight for the Senior Manager: Controlling Risk
in Dealers, in Derivatives Handbook: Risk Management and Control, supra note 8, at
354, 401.
215. See id. (discussing the development of a model for senior management to take
explicit account of trading, marketing, hedging, credit, risk management, operations
technology, regulatory, and legal costs in the pricing of derivative transactions); see
also 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1237-64 (providing a thorough analy-
sis of the multitude of costs incurred by a financial firm in maintaining an ongoing
derivatives operation). Das divides the costs across three structural areas: (1) front
office; (2) middle office; and (3) back office. See id. at 1241. Among the front office
costs are the costs of the traders and salesman, the dealing room, trade brokerage
commission, systems for pricing, hedging, risk management simulation, and client re-
lationship management. See id. at 1240-44. The middle office costs include the costs
of producing risk, profit and loss, general ledger, credit, and market data reports as
well as the costs of the underlying technological support systems. See id. at 1241. The
back office costs include the systems necessary to generate trade confirmations, notifi-
cations, and the resets on underlying variable indexes. See id.
216. See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 29, at 429.
217. See i.
218. See id. at 429-31. One scholar espouses the theory that as financial innovation
has led to the creation of derivatives, derivatives in turn have led to a process of "legal
engineering" and "legal innovation." See McLauglin, supra note 2, at 1, 159. He
states, "A modern paradigm of legal innovation is the development of the standard
industry form 'master agreements' that now pervade both OTC derivatives and other
financial market." Id. at 159. McLauglin notes that without the development of this
legal engineering to remove the uncertainty concerning the key terms and conditions
underlying swap transactions, the growth of the product would have been substan-
tially curtailed. See id.
219. See i. at 432.
220. See id. at 433.
221. See id.
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("ISDA") Master Swap Agreements.2 2 Although the agreement is
standardized, it also contains a Schedule in which all unique terms
between the couterparties are negotiated.2 3 Arriving at a final
Master Agreement often involves extensive negotiations, as the agree-
ment is intended to encompass all future swap transactions between
the two counterparties 24
As swaps have evolved and their returns narrowed, it has become
critical for swap dealers to be able to both finely price and hedge the
transactions,2 5 which involves substantial expenditure in computer
technology. It requires computers with the fastest calculating and
processing times. 26 Swap dealers employ "rocket scientists" to de-
velop the complex financial models behind the products' valuations
and hedging.22 7 Before a customer executes a swap, he is provided
with numerous trading ideas and market analyses.22 8 After a trade is
executed, customers frequently require market valuations of their ex-
isting transaction as well as future market analysis.22 9 Customers re-
quire traders to provide indicative price quotations on transactions
they are considering, but may ultimately not execute.230 Firms expend
substantial marketing and trading costs for any executed transaction.
As swaps are risk-managed collectively in a portfolio, the risks in the
portfolio are ongoing and need to be managed with each change in
market conditions. 3 a Substantial time and technology resources are
devoted to hedging the market risks of the swap portfolio. 32
During the initial phase of development of swaps, as with any new
product, the returns generated were substantial.233 As the activity ma-
222. See Ian Wallace, Legal and Documentation Issues of Swaps and Financial De-
rivatives, in 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1341, 1343-45. Master Swap
Agreements were developed by representatives from the leading dealer banks (com-
mercial and investment banks) in a trade association, the International Swap Dealers
Association. See Kenneth R. Kapner & John F. Marshall, The Swaps Handbook:
Swaps and Related Risk Management Instruments 562-63 (Supp. 1992). The trade
association later changed its name to The International Swaps and Derivatives associ-
ation, Inc. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1440.
223. See Wallace, supra note 222, at 1344. The ISDA Master Agreements are struc-
tured to contain only fundamental operational terms and conditions. The Schedule
gives the parties the ability to modify the core document. The legal matters that are
addressed in the Schedule include whether there are any specified entities, cross de-
fault provisions, credit support agreements, governing law, or early termination con-
siderations. See id. at 1344-45.
224. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1246.
225. See id. at 1254.
226. See id.
227. See Greenwald, supra note 15, at 32.
228. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1241-42.
229. See id. at 1242.
230. See id. Ultimately, the consumer may not execute these hypothetical transac-
tion and indicative quotes. See id.
231. See id. at 1020-21.
232. See id. at 954-55.
233. See 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 18.
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tured, swaps "evolved into competitive, transparent, liquid, and in-
creasingly 'commoditized' markets in which bid-offer spreads... have
declined... precipitously ...... I In today's competitive environ-
ment, a swap dealer earns, at most, one to three basis points per year
on the underlying notional principal amount of a "plain vanilla" trans-
action. 35 Thus, on a three-year, $100 million transaction, a swap
dealer will take in at most, $82,000 in revenue.-36 On a consumer
transaction on a notional principal amount of $1000, the dealing insti-
tution would only take in eighty-two cents. Thus, consumer swap
transactions will only be profitable to swap dealers if they can access a
high volume of activity in a low cost manner.
The expansion of swaps into the consumer arena would establish
"market completeness" for what Robert Merton defines as the finan-
cial innovation spiral.3 He posits that as new financial products
enter the market, their volume will expand, which in turn "reduces
marginal transaction costs ... which in turn leads to still more volume
... spiraling toward the theoretically limiting case of zero marginal
transaction costs and dynamically complete markets."23s The high
volume of institutional swaps has led to legal, financial, and, most im-
portantly, technological innovations that have lowered the fixed costs
of swap transactions2 39 These cost reductions, combined with the
cost reductions available through electronic funds transfers and the
Internet, have made offering swaps to individuals feasible. 4
234. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 17; see 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at
28-29.
235. See 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 162 (detailing the bid-ask
spread carried on an electronic pricing screen for United States dollar interest rate
swaps); Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 7 (defining a plain vanilla swap
as an interest rate swap in which one party pays a fixed rate and the other party pays a
floating rate indexed to prevailing interbank Eurodeposit rate, the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR)). A basis point is an interest rate equal to one one-hundredth
of one percentage point, i.e., 0.01 percent. See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 11, at
485.
236. This calculation is performed on a present value basis, discounted annually at
five percent.
237. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 16.
238. Id (quoting Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and Economic Perform-
ance, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 1992, at 4).
239. See id. at 16-17, 19.
240. See Philip S. Corwin, The Virtual Dotted Line: Understanding Digital Signa-
tures, Banking Pol'y Rep., Feb. 17, 1997, at 1, 1 ("According to many observers, the
explosion of digital commerce facilitated by the Internet is simply a matter of when,
not if."). At the American Banking Association convention in 1995, the biggest draw
among the convention's proffered demonstrations was that of personal banking in the
future. See The Rubber Meets the Road, Economist, Sept. 16, 1995, at 87, 87 (-Using a
computer mouse, one can walk from the shopping mall into the bank and conduct
financial business."). It has been observed that:
As the Web develops, consumers [will] take control of their own financial
destinies, national boundaries [will] be removed, distinctions between finan-
cial products [will] evaporate and broad offices, administrative centers and
piles of marketing literature [will] disappear.... [A] customer in Australia,
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C. The Future Structure of Retail Derivatives
The cost savings afforded by derivatives as a risk management in-
strument are significant. As one commentator has observed,
"[f]undamentally, swaps represent perhaps the most significant finan-
cial innovation in capital markets in the latter half of the 20th cen-
tury.... Swaps serve to foster more rapid growth in ... capital flows
allowing the channeling of excess savings in one market to an-
other.""' Swaps significantly lowered corporate funding costs by en-
abling corporate borrowers to have access to new foreign capital
markets through eliminating unwanted foreign exchange risk. The
benefits of altering the nature of the interest payments or investment
returns of an underlying borrowing or investment, without having to
first cancel the initial transaction and renegotiate the replacement
transaction, are clear. There seems to be no reason as to why this
flexibility and cost savings should be denied to consumers. For exam-
ple, enabling consumers to re-balance their investments and borrow-
ings through swaps would provide consumers with greater financial
flexibility and tailored risk management.242 Consider an individual
who has a fixed rate mortgage but who would now prefer to make his
interest payments on a variable rate basis. Currently, the consumer
would have to prepay his existing fixed rate mortgage and negotiate a
new variable rate mortgage agreement. Consumer swaps would allow
the individual to effect this change without prepayment through the
convenience of an ATM or the Internet. Consumers as investors,
make asset class decisions.243 Swaps would allow consumers to instan-
taneously alter their asset class allocations without incurring the costs
using only his television set [will] obtain his pension in the [United States],
buy a German bond in Frankfurt and invest in a tax-exempt scheme in
Dublin.
Scott Andersen, Calculating Net Worth, Private Banker Int'l, July 1, 1997, at 15, avail-
able in 1997 WL 12398033.
The Internet volume for United Stated stocks is estimated to be $3.2 billion a day,
See Perri Colley McKinney, A New Breed of Investment Company Is Introducing the
Masses to Currency Trading, Once the Province of the Rich Internet Forex Attracts
Smaller Players, S. China Morning Post, Oct. 4, 1998, at 9, available in 1998 WL
22021545. According to a survey conducted by the Bank Marketing Association, fi-
nancial websites were visited by 70% of online consumers in 1996 and 34% used fi-
nancial websites regularly. See Bernadette Tracy, New Customers Are Waiting Online
at the Electronic Banking "Window": 1997 Could Be the Year of "Electronic Com-
merce", Bank Mkt., Jan. 1, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 10172531. A survey re-
vealed that 46% of the people interviewed went online to get help in making their
financial decisions, such as buying CDs and mutual funds. Additionally, 31% of these
financial "surfers" bought financial products at retail. See id.
241. Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 651.
242. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 198-99.
243. See infra Part V.D.
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of actually liquidating the underlying investment and simultaneously
contracting to enter into a new investment. 244
Since the inception of privately negotiated derivatives, many have
viewed the extension of derivatives into the consumer arena as inevi-
table.245 As Bidyut Sen, former managing director and co-head of the
World Wide Derivative Products Group at Morgan Stanley & Co., has
stated, "[iut is possible... banks could provide a range of derivative-
based investment options: perhaps even through ATMs. For exam-
ple, a person could stop at the corner ATM and transfer funds into a
principal-protected S&P 500 fund." '246
Opponents of the extension of derivatives into the consumer world
state that derivatives are simply too complex and that consumers will
never participate in an activity they do not understand.247 But, it is
unnecessary and sometimes impossible for an individual to compre-
hend the technical mechanics and operations of a derivatives transac-
tion.2' For example, while most individuals know how to operate a
car, few "know how the internal combustion engine works or how
transmissions are put together."24 9 Most homeowners have experi-
ence with mortgages that contain periodic or lifetime caps, although
very few of them probably understand the fundamentals of cap pric-
ing, hedging, or trading. 50 Further, it does not seem too complex for
a consumer in the Chase S&P example to understand switching his
return from a money market to an equity base.
This Note predicts that the following structure will develop for con-
sumer derivatives: (1) the consumer will place a minimum notional
principal amount on deposit with a financial institution; (2) the finan-
cial institution will pay a defined periodic interest to the individual at
a money market yield; if the financial institution approves the credit
risk of the individual," he will then be authorized to enter into a
244. Retail participation in energy derivatives through the Internet is also being
forecasted. See Douglas F. John & Ronald S. Oppenheimer, The Commodization of
Energy, Nat. Resources & Env't, Spring 1998, at 251,251. The authors discuss that it
may not be long before homeowners "sit down at [their] personal computer screens
and order $100 worth of 'cold' or 'hot' from a supplier of [their] choice." Id. This is
because various technological developments have led to the "commoditization" of
energy which has in turn led to the development of a derivatives products that %ill
ultimately extend to the consumer. See id. 251, 254.
245. See Filler, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that "the retail ... population could
increase both in number and trading volume as electronic trading interfaces are cre-
ated to permit direct access... to anyone owning a PC.").
246. Id. at 198; see supra Introduction. Such a fund is comparable to the Chase
S&P Indexed CD. See supra notes 181-95 and accompanying text.
247. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 198.
248. See id-
249. Id.
250. See iL
251. See Status of ATMs Under State Branching Laws: Hearings on S. 2898 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 113 (1984)
[hereinafter ATM Hearings] (noting that banks are already able to extend credit risk
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variety of asset class swap transactions, where the numeraire (base
index against which other asset class alternatives are priced) will be
the CD money market yield; and (3) prior to the execution of the first
swap transaction, the customer and the financial institution will nego-
tiate and execute a highly customized Master Swap Agreement to suit
both the individual's creditworthiness and financial objectives,
dovetailing what exists in the institutional market.
For example, the consumer could enter into an equity swap contract
with the financial institution. Under the terms of the contract, the
individual would agree to pay to the financial institution the money
market yield he was earning on his CD in return for receiving the
return on the S&P 500 index over a defined time period, plus or minus
a spread. Thus, in addition to the certificate of deposit, there would
also exist a swap contract between the financial institution and the
consumer documenting the equity swap.
Further, the individual, through either the Internet 252 or an
ATM,253 could enter into a second swap transaction to transfer his
interest payments back to either a money market yield or the return
on a global fund index or other asset class. Confirmations of the
transactions could be generated at the exact same time the swap is
transacted, either through the Internet or at the ATM. To assure
themselves of the best price, individuals would negotiate Master Swap
Agreements with various financial institutions. Thus, if a consumer
did not like the spread he was receiving on the S&P index in exchange
for the money market yield he was receiving from one bank, he could
transact with another bank if the latter provided a better spread.
The tremendous expansion of swap activity in the institutional
arena is due to technology.24 Technology takes two forms: hardware
(computers and other electronic networks) and software (financial en-
gineering). 5 Swap dealers have been able to offer larger volumes of
derivatives transactions due to the development of technology systems
to consumers through ATMs as evidenced by the set up of cash advances against pre-
approved credit lines).
252. Consumer enthusiasm for executing financial transactions can be gathered by
looking to other markets such as electronic securities trading. "On-line securities
trading grew 181[%] to 26 million transactions in 1997 and should gain another 91[%]
this year." Susan Abbott Gidel, Shifting Markets: Internet Use Growing, Futures In-
dustry, Apr./May 1998, at 14, 14.
253. ATMs first appeared in 1969 and grew to 2900 by the end of 1974. They were
initially regarded with skepticism, as it was thought that consumers might not neces-
sarily trust transactions through a machine over those with an actual person. See ATM
Hearings, supra note 251, at 58. "These figures... underscore the public acceptance
of, and reliance upon, the convenient services that ATM's and shared ATM networks
provide." Id. at 59.
254. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 67, 197.
255. See id. at 197. "The growth of ... derivatives owes much to modern finance
theory and to the speed, power, and widespread availability of computers." Id. at 67.
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that enable them to inexpensively revalue and re-hedge their portfo-
lios in real time. 6
Cost is no longer a prohibitive factor to offering retail derivatives,
as "[t]he derivatives technology as well as the network technology for
[consumer derivatives] already exists." It is a natural evolution in
financial product development that when the costs of providing what
has been an exclusively institutional financial product fall significantly,
the product will become available to retail investors. s58 One example
is provided by the Liberty Loan program of 1917, instituted during
World War I by the United States Government. The government at-
tempted to fund its wartime efforts by selling small-denominated
bonds to "a new clientele: retail investors."' 59
The Treasury immediately decided to mount an intensive nation-
wide sales effort. Advertisements and thousands of spokesmen em-
phasized the security, high yield, and probable appreciation of the
new Liberty bonds. Established techniques were put aside. Instead
of selling substantial amounts of large denominations for holding in
relatively few hands, the government issued bonds in small denomi-
nations, utilized war savings stamps widely, and permitted install-
ment payments. All the foregoing "new" departures were designed
to appeal to individuals not considered potential investors since the
Civil War days of Jay Cooke.260
The marketing and sale of treasury securities to individuals as well
as institutional players was a natural development in the establish-
ment of market completeness3 61 The extension of swaps to consum-
ers is similarly an inevitable part of the process of market
completeness. Of course, along with this process comes the inevitable
government desire to regulate. Part IV discusses the applicability of
SEC and CFTC regulation to retail swaps.
IV. APPLICATION OF SEC/CFTC REGULATION TO RETAIL SWAPS
One of the initial hurdles retail derivatives must overcome is avoid-
ing SEC and CFTC jurisdictional claims, which are made simply be-
cause they involve retail activity. Although there are no bright line
256. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 17; see also 2 Das, Global Reference, supra
note 35, at 950-55 (discussing the evolution of swaps from a fully matched brokered
business to one of market making and portfolio management).
257. Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 198. A former chairman of the CFTC, Philip
McBride Johnson comments, "cyberspace will make [derivatives] readily available to
traders world wide." Johnson, supra note 13, at 20.
258. See Peter Tufano, Securities Innovations: A Historical and Functional Perspec-
tive, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 1995, at 90, 92.
259. Id.
260. Id at 93 (quoting V. Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History 225
(1970)).
261. See id at 92-93; supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (discussing Robert
Merton's "innovation spiral" hypothesis).
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rules for determining whether a derivative product is a future, secur-
ity, or swap, based on current regulation and existing case law retail
derivatives should safely remain outside of both SEC and CFTC regu-
latory jurisdiction. This part discusses the definitional issues sur-
rounding the terms "future" and "security" as well as the implications
of the current definitional ambiguity for swaps.
A. The SEC Has No Regulatory Authority
1. Definitions
The crucial issue in determining whether retail swaps would be sub-
ject to SEC regulatory authority is if the transactions could be deemed
a security.262 Under the '33 Act and the '34 Act (collectively "the
Acts"), a security is defined broadly. In the '33 Act, Congress defined
the term "security" as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of in-
debtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of de-
posit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.263
Parts of the definition, such as stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures,
appear straightforward.2" Other parts, such as investment contracts
and interests commonly known as securities, seem more ambiguous.265
Certainly, the definition of "security" established in the Acts was not
262. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 183. A financial product is potentially sub-
ject to the securities laws and SEC jurisdiction if it falls within the definition of a
security. Any swap that has a security or a formula tied to a security as its underlying
index is also potentially a security. See id.
263. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994). The definition section of the '34 Act is virtually
identical and encompasses the same instruments as the '33 Act. See id. § 78c(a)(10).
The '33 Act requires the registration of most securities and disclosure of information
specific to the issuing entity. See Benson, supra note 171, at 1184. The '34 Act created
the SEC as an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory agency, charged with the respon-
sibility of "protect[ing] the public from fraud and abuses in the securities markets."
Id. The SEC does not analyze securities offerings for their economic return; the
SEC's premise is that with adequately disclosed information, an investor can make his
own judgment on a security's value. See id. at 1185.
264. See Cox, supra note 114, at 117.
265. See id.
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originally intended to include swaps, since they did not develop until
nearly fifty years after the Acts' inception.2
Swap contracts could, however, be classified as a security if they are
determined to fall under one of the broader components of the Acts'
definition-investment contract or note. The Acts do not define these
two terms, but the accepted definitions come from two landmark
Supreme Court cases. In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,267 the Court de-
fined an investment contract as: (1) an investment; (2) in a common
enterprise; (3) with the expectation of profit; (4) solely from the ef-
forts of others. 6 And in Reves v. Ernst & Yotng,269 the Court laid
out the framework for defining a note. It adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's family resemblance test, ruling that a note is presumed to be a
security.270 That presumption may only be rebutted by showing that
the note bears a strong resemblance to an identified list of commonly-
denominated notes that fall outside the definition of security.2Vl
Courts consider the following four factors in determining whether a
transaction bears a family resemblance to the excluded list: (1) the
motivations of the buyer and seller in entering into the transaction; (2)
the plan of distribution of the instrument; (3) the reasonable expecta-
tions of the investing public; and (4) whether there is an alternative
regulatory scheme or risk reducing factor.272
266. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 183-84. McLauglin notes that swaps have
traditionally been regarded as a risk management device rather than as capital raising
investments. See i. Although a small number of swap transactions were executed in
the 1970s, swaps were not regarded as an established international capital markets
transaction until the August 1981 landmark swap transaction between World Bank
and IBM. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 6; supra note 89 and accompany-
ing text.
267. 328 U. S. 293 (1946).
268. See id. at 299. In Howey, investors were offered units of a citrus grove devel-
opment coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing, and remitting the net pro-
ceeds. See it- at 295. The investors provided the capital and shared in the earnings
and profits; the promoters managed, controlled, and operated the enterprise. See id.
at 299. The Court held that an offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled
with a service contract was a security under § 2(1) of the '33 Act. See id. at 298-300.
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), the court modified
the third prong of the Howey test to eliminate the word "solely." The court held that
the securities laws can not be circumvented by requiring investors to nominally par-
ticipate in the management of their ventures. See id. at 480.
269. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
270. See id. at 64-65.
271. The types of notes that are not securities under the Acts are detailed in the
case of Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
These notes include notes delivered in consumer financing, notes secured by a home
mortgage, short-term notes secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets,
notes evidencing a personal loan to bank customer, short-term notes secured by an
assignment of accounts receivables, and notes which are collateralized and formalize
an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business. See id. at 1138. The
court found these notes to essentially be "note[s] or other evidence[s] of indebtedness
issued in a mercantile transaction." Id.
272. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990).
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As swap dealers structure retail swaps, they must ensure that the
new product remains outside of SEC regulatory jurisdiction. As one
commentator has observed, categorization can make all the
difference:
"Whether a financing transaction is a security is a weighty issue for
[swap] participants. If the ['33] Act covers the arrangement, two
consequences result. One, the arrangement must be registered with
the [SEC], unless an exemption applies. Two, with or without a re-
gistration exemption, the antifraud provisions of the ['33] Act and
the... ['34] Act... will apply." Additional complications may also
arise. For example, if a swap transaction is deemed to be a security,
both parties will "have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5, private
placement procedures must be followed more carefully, dealers may
have to register as broker-dealers with the SEC, and the SEC's net
capital rules may apply to some bank subsidiaries."' 73
Undeniably, if retail swaps are deemed to be securities the regulatory
implications are significant.
2. Case Law
One concern facing swap dealers are those swap contracts under
which one set of cashflows is determined in reference to a security or a
formula that involves the value of a security. Such transactions could
potentially themselves be a security as the underlying value of the
swap contract is ultimately dependent upon the value of security or
formula.274 Because swaps are a relatively new financial product,
however, existing applicable case law is scarce. In Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,275 the court applied the Howey and the
Reves tests to determine that the security-linked, privately negotiated
derivatives at issue were not securities. 7 6 In Marine Bank v.
Weaver,277 the Supreme Court held that a conventional bank certifi-
cate of deposit and a privately negotiated business agreement between
two parties were not securities.2 78 This section discusses each case in
turn.
a. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.
In 1993 and 1994, Procter & Gamble ("P&G") entered into two
highly-specialized swap transactions with Bankers Trust. The first,
known as a 5s/30s swap, derived its value from a mathematical rela-
273. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 184 (quoting Christopher Olander & Cynthia
Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal Tax and Securities Laws, 45 Md. L.
Rev. 21, 53-54 (1986), and John C. Coffee, Jr., Bankers Trust Settlement: Whither the
Swaps Market?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 1995, at 5).
274. See id. at 183.
275. 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
276. See id. at 1277-83.
277. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
278. See id. at 555.
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tionship between yields on five-year Treasury Notes and prices of
thirty-year Treasury Bonds. 7 9 The second transaction, known as a
DM swap, was a highly leveraged swap whose value was derived from
both a put and a call on Deutsche mark interest rates,9 As both
United States and German interest rates moved against P&G, the
company terminated the transactions with Bankers Trust at a loss of
over $200 million to P&G.2s1 P&G did not pay Bankers Trust.'
Rather, it brought a cause of action against Bankers Trust alleging,
among other claims, violation of the securities laws3.2 In particular,
P&G asserted that the two swaps fell within the definition of security
as defined as: "(1) investment contracts; (2) notes; (3) evidence of
indebtedness; (4) options on securities; and (5) instruments commonly
known as securities." 2  The court dealt with each of these allegations
in turn, observing that, "[e]conomic reality is the guide for determin-
ing whether these swaps transactions that do not squarely fit within
the statutory definition are, nevertheless, securities."'
First, in determining whether the two swaps could be considered
investment contracts, the court restated the Howey test, defining an
investment contract as "an investment in a common venture premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived for the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."'  It held that the P&G
swaps were not investment contracts because P&G's money was not
combined with that of any other entity in a single commercial ven-
ture" and the "value of the swaps depended on market forces, and
not on [Bankers Trust's] entrepreneurial efforts."'
The court turned next to analyzing whether the swaps were notes,
using the Supreme Court's four part "family resemblance" test estab-
lished in Reves. 9 The court outlined the four factors for considera-
tion: "(1) the motivation of the buyer and seller in entering in to the
transaction... ; (2) a sufficiently broad plan of distribution... ; (3)
the reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (4) whether
some factor, such as the existence of another regulatory scheme, sig-
nificantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering the
application of the securities laws unnecessary.
' 290
279. See Bankers Trust Co., at 1276.
280. See id. at 1276-77.
281. See id
282. See id at 1277.
283. See id. at 1274.
284. Id at 1277.
285. Id
286. Id. at 1277-78 (citations omitted).
287. See id at 1278.
288. Id.
289. See id
290. Id at 1278-79.
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The court held that the P&G swaps did not meet the first three
prongs of the test.291 The swaps were regarded by the court to be
closer to commercial rather than investment contracts as Bankers
Trust's motive in transacting the swaps was to earn a fee and P&G's to
reduce funding costs.29 Because the 5s/30s and DM swaps were cus-
tomized and could only be traded to another counterparty with the
agreement of Bankers Trust, the court held they were not part of a
general offering to the public.29 3 As the swaps were not traded on a
national exchange, "the paradigm of a security," they could not rea-
sonably be regarded as securities by the public. 94 On the fourth
prong, existing regulatory scheme, the court was divided. It acknowl-
edged that although the transactions fell under the guidelines of the
banking authorities, those regulations are generally for the protection
of the banks and their shareholders and not their customers.2 95 The
court ultimately concluded that despite the divided opinion on the
fourth prong of the Reves test, the P&G swaps did not fall within the
statutory definition of a note for purposes of the securities laws. 96
P&G asserted that the swaps were evidence of indebtedness be-
cause they contained bilateral promises to pay money and thus estab-
lished a debt between the two parties."9 The court dismissed the
claim as it held that the appropriate test was the Reves test, which the
swaps had already failed. 98 Further, the court stated that as the terms
of the swaps did not involve the repayment of principal, they were
missing an essential element of a debt instrument. 99 In an interest
rate swap transaction, only interest payments and not principal are
exchanged.°
The court then turned to whether the swaps could be deemed op-
tions on securities. The definition of "security" in the Acts added in
the 1982 amendments, the parenthetical phrase "including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof," which could mean that an op-
tion based on the value of a security is a security.3° ' The court dis-
missed the claim by examining the language from the House Report
to conclude "the parenthetical phrase.., was intended only to modify
the immediately preceding clause-'group or index of securities'-
and not the words 'any option' or 'any security."' 3  Thc court also
held that the swaps were not options as the interest payments under
291. See id. at 1279.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. Id. (citation omitted).
295. See id. at 1280.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. Id. at 1281.
302. Id. (citation omitted).
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the contracts were required and did not provide for an exercise right
or a right to take delivery.30 3
P&G's final contention was that the 5s/30s and DM swap were se-
curities because they were instruments commonly known as securi-
ties.3" The court dismissed this claim, once again applying the Howey
test as mandated by the Supreme Court.30 5
b. Marine Bank v. Weaver
In this case, the Weavers had purchased a $50 million certificate of
deposit from Marine Bank, which they later pledged to Marine Bank
to guarantee a $65,000 loan made by the bank to a slaughterhouse. 0 6
The Weavers entered into a privately negotiated agreement with the
slaughterhouse, whereby they were to receive half of the slaughter-
house's net profits, $100 per month while the guarantee was in place,
use of the slaughterhouse's barn and pasture, and the right to veto
future borrowings by the slaughterhouse, in consideration for guaran-
teeing the bank loan.307 When the slaughterhouse went bankrupt, the
Weavers filed a complaint that Marine Bank had violated § 10(b) of
the '34 Act.30 8
The Supreme Court held that neither the CD nor the private agree-
ment was a security.30 9 While acknowledging that the "definition of
security in the ['34 Act] is quite broad, 310 the Court was, content with
the fact that "in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide
a broad federal remedy for all fraud."31' The Court held that a CD
issued by a federally-regulated bank was not a security and was distin-
guishable from any other long-term debt obligation commonly found
to be a security, due to the existence of extensive banking regula-
tion.312 The Court held that the privately negotiated contract between
the Weavers and the slaughterhouse was also not a security as it was a
unique agreement that was not intended to be traded publicly.313
B. The CFTC Has No Regulatory Authority
The CFTC, created in 1974 to guard the public from fraud and price
manipulation in the futures market, is somewhat of a new federal reg-
ulator.314 As early futures contracts were limited to agricultural com-
303. See id. at 1281-82.
304. See id at 1282.
305. See id. at 1282-83.
306. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 552-53 (1982).
307. See id.
308. See id at 553-54.
309. See icL at 559-60.
310. Id. at 555.
311. See hi. at 556.
312. See id. at 557-58.
313. See id at 560.
314. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4b, 4o, 6(c)b (1994).
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modities, they were regulated by an entity within the Department of
Agriculture.315 At the time futures regulation was initially enacted in
the 1920s, and even at the time of the CFTC's creation in 1974, no one
had envisioned the regulation to include swap transactions. 316
The legal definition of a futures contract is the determinative factor
for CFTC jurisdiction under the CEA.317 While the Act contains no
statutory definition of "futures contract, ' 318 the term has been re-
garded to fit broadly into the language of a "contract for the purchase
or sale of a commodity for future delivery. '319 The 1974 Act also ex-
panded the definition of commodity to include non agricultural prod-
ucts such as financial products.32 °
The expanded definition of commodity under the 1974 Act, coupled
with the vague and broad definition of futures, created substantial
legal uncertainty for swap participants.32 ' Starting in 1987, when the
CFTC began an enforcement investigation into the commodity swap
activity of Chase Manhattan,322 swap participants have actively
worked with the CFTC to receive assurance that swaps would con-
tinue to fall outside of CFTC regulatory jurisdiction.32 3 These indus-
try efforts have resulted in increased legal certainty. The first example
came through the issuance of the Swaps Policy Statement that pro-
vided a safe harbor for the majority of swap transactions.32 4 The sec-
ond example was the 1993 Swaps Exemption,32 5 which exempted
"certain classes of investors, specified institutions, and persons with
assets over $10 million, from operation of all but the antifraud and
manipulation provisions of the CEA. ' '3 26
315. See Romano, supra note 30, at 22.
316. See supra note 266 (discussing that although a few swap transactions had been
executed in the 1970s, 1981 marked the actual beginning of the swap market). It is
interesting to observe that a former CFTC chairman, Mary L. Schapiro, has noted
that derivatives were not contemplated at the time of the drafting of the CEA. See
Harris, supra note 203, at 1167. In a 1995 speech, she stated that the application of
"[the] 'inflexible' [exchange trading] 'requirement to innovative OTC financial prod-
ucts ... [was] clearly never envisioned [by the law's drafters]."' See id. (quoting
Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks to the National Capital of the National As-
sociation of Business Economists (Feb. 15, 1995)).
317. See Romano, supra note 30, at 24.
318. See id. at 25.
319. Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 62.
320. The original definition of commodity under the CEA was limited to agricul-
tural products. See supra note 140. In 1974, the definition was broadened with lan-
guage that could cover financial futures as well. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text (providing the broadened definition of commodity).
321. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 62.
322. See infra notes 384-87, and accompanying text.
323. See Romano, supra note 30, at 55; supra Part II.B.
324. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694
(1989).
325. CFTC Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1996).
326. 7 U.S.C. § 6(d) (1994); see Romano, supra note 30, at 56. Romano notes that
the exemption was limited-prohibiting swaps to be structured as standardized con-
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Legal uncertainty remains for swap participants, however, because
the CFTC's Swap Exemption "does not settle whether swaps are fu-
tures contracts within the meaning of the CEA.' '327 While the CFTC
did not determine that swaps are futures, it is troubling that Congress
granted the CFTC exemptive authority and directed the CFTC to use
that authority for swaps, because if swaps were not futures under the
CEA, they would not need an exemption.3" Further uncertainty re-
mains because an exemption is always reversible by the agency?219
The exemption is uncertain about whether the CFTC, in its reserva-
tion of the right to exert the fraud and manipulation rules of the CEA,
can unilaterally enforce that right against swap participants. 330 On
one hand, it is possible that the CFTC intended to maintain enforce-
ment authority over swaps regardless of whether swaps are futures.331
It is also possible, however, that the CFTC would only exert such ju-
risdiction if swaps were, in fact, found to be futures under the CEA. a2
While the CFTC has traditionally avoided providing a precise defi-
nition of what are deemed to be futures for purposes of the CEA,3 33 it
has established at least four conditions it perceives as necessary for a
contract to be a futures contract: "(1) a standardized contract, (2) of-
fered to the general public, (3) secured by earnest money or margin,
and (4) entered into primarily for the purpose of shifting price risk
and not for transferring ownership of the actual commodities." 334
These elements were considered necessary but not sufficient for a con-
tract to be viewed as a future. In a 1995 settlement agreement with
MG Refining and Marketing, Inc. ("MGRM") and MG Futures Inc.
("MGFI"), however, the CFTC defined "'all the essential elements of
a futures contract,' suggesting a list of sufficient conditions for the first
time. '335 The conditions under the settlement agreement that are suf-
tracts or settled through a clearinghouse. See Romano, supra note 30, at 56. Further,
the exemption requires that a swap counterparty's creditworthiness be an essential
factor of the transaction. See id. These qualifying conditions were intended to protect
the competitiveness of futures exchanges that objected to the Swaps Exemption be-
cause swaps, being unregulated, would be cheaper and hence more competitive than
futures. See id.; Hillary Davis, A Million A Minute: Inside the World of Securities
Trading-The Men, the Women, the Money that Make the Markets Work 157 (1998)
(discussing the OTC market's major encroachment into the futures industry, resulting
in a precipitous fall in the volume of futures transactions due to more favorable OTC
regulation).
327. Romano, supra note 30, at 57.
328. See Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction, supra note 8, at 478.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 478-79.
332. See hi. at 479.
333. See id. at 483.
334. Romano, supra note 30, at 25. The fourth element requires that the contract
be cash settled rather than through actual physical delivery. See id.
335. Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction, supra note 8, at 483 (citation
omitted).
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ficient to define a futures contract are: "(1) if it contains a price or
pricing formula specified at the contract's inception, (2) it can be
honored either by physical delivery or an offsetting transaction [cash
settled] ... , and (3) it is used either to speculate or hedge. 336
C. Implication for Retail Derivatives
Because swaps are neither a future nor security, as the product ex-
pands to include retail activity, it should still remain outside of CFTC
and SEC regulatory jurisdiction. The holdings and analytical
frameworks of Procter & Gamble337 and Marine Bank338 provide valu-
able support for structuring the envisioned consumer swap transac-
tions that will remain outside of United States securities regulation.
The holding in Weaver should provide assurance to bank swap dealers
that any underlying CD transaction, even if pledged to the originating
bank as credit support for the swap transactions, will not be deemed a
security. Further, it provides strong support that privately negotiated
one-on-one swap contracts will be outside SEC regulatory jurisdiction.
The Procter & Gamble opinion was the first published decision by a
United States court addressing the broad range of legal issues applica-
ble to swaps and swap-related products. 339 The rulings, as they are
under the laws of Ohio, are not controlling for most swap contracts
which are generally governed by the laws of England or New York.340
Legal scholars and market participants, however, regard the court's
careful and thorough analysis of the "relevent [sic] legal issues [as] an
unmistakable effort to establish a comprehensive framework for ana-
lyzing the regulatory and common law treatment of swaps."'34'
Procter & Gamble supports the idea that swap transactions, depend-
ing on how they are structured, are outside of the '33 and '34 Acts.
Retail derivatives should remain outside of SEC regulatory jurisdic-
tion as long as swap dealers structure retail swaps such that: (1) their
value is determined by market forces and not the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of the swap dealer; (2) one customer's transaction
is not pooled with that of another; (3) they are individually custom-
ized to each customer's objectives; and (4) they cannot be traded or
sold by either the dealer or the customer without the consent of the
other counterparty.
CFTC regulatory jurisdiction over the retail swaps outlined in this
Note will have a chilling effect on their development. By definition,
336. Id.
337. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
338. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
339. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 204.
340. See Jackson, supra note 98, at 207. The ISDA Master Swap Agreement pro-
vides for the selection of either New York or English law. See 2 Das, Global Refer-
ence, supra note 35, at 1374.
341. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 204-05.
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retail would be involved in retail swap activity, providing the CFTC
with some muscle to assert regulatory authority.?1 2 The individual-
ized, customized nature of each consumer transaction, however, cuts
against the argument of authority. Ultimately, if consumer swaps are
deemed to be a future, the exchange-trading requirement of the CEA
would make such a product prohibitively unattractive to all but the
most financially sophisticated and active consumer.
Privately negotiated retail derivative transactions are particularly
vulnerable to assertions of CFTC jurisdiction for two reasons. First,
under the classical four necessary elements definition of a futures con-
tract,343 consumer swaps squarely meet two of the conditions. The
transactions will be offered to the general public, and will be entered
into primarily, if not exclusively, for the purposes of shifting price risk
(cash settled) and not for the purposes of delivering physical commod-
ities. The potential for CFTC jurisdiction is increased under the suffi-
cient conditions definition of a futures contract provided in the
MGRMMGFI settlement agreement, which has as a component that
the contract is either used to speculate or hedge.3 It is hard to deny
that a consumer entering into a retail swap to alter the interest rate
risk on their mortgage is not hedging. Additionally, it is hard to deny
that an individual using a CD combined with an equity swap to trans-
form his fixed interest payments on the CD to a return pegged to an
equity index, although implicitly making an investment, could be said
to be "speculating" on the stock market.
Cutting against these definitional elements that would brand retail
swaps as "futures" is the great degree of customizations to individual
portfolio objectives that would be required for retail derivatives to be
a success. By definition, individuals have unique financial and risk
objectives and requirements. Individuals that will potentially be
utilizing retail swaps will have different contractual requirements, in-
cluding maturity, payment dates, principal amount, payment provi-
sions, cashflow exchanges, and credit standings.31s The greater the
customization, the more likely consumer swaps will remain outside of
the CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction, as their lack of standardization
will preclude their being able to be traded on an exchange. 1 6
For retail swaps to develop, it is essential that they remain outside
of the CEA and its exchange-trading requirement. In many instances,
when a new financial product is determined to be a future, the ex-
342. See supra Part II.B.2.
343. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
345. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 197-99.
346. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 22. The standardization of
futures contracts and the resulting ease of offset is what makes futures more attractive
than other forms of derivatives to some derivatives users. See id. at 18.
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change-trading requirement is "tantamount to a death sentence for
trading that product in the United States., 347
[T]o be traded on an exchange a product must receive the prior
approval of the CFTC as part of the CFTC's "contract designation"
process, which includes in essence a review of the product's intrinsic
merits. Under CEA § 5(7), the CFTC must conclude that the con-
tract has an "economic purpose" and that trading in the instrument
"will not be contrary to the public interest." The generality of the
"economic purpose" standard and the "public interest" test neces-
sarily convey wide agency discretion and raise difficult problems of
proof for the proponents of new products. Consequently, the con-
tract designation process is at best time-consuming-it can take
years.
348
Due to the difficulties in introducing a new futures contract, a require-
ment that consumer derivatives be traded on an exchange would most
likely prohibit their ever reaching the consumer.
Implicit in structuring a contract to be traded on an exchange is
standardization,349 which provides price transparency as well as the
ability to instantly unwind a position by purchasing or selling an off-
setting contract.350 Because they are standardized contracts, futures
will be unattractive to individuals. The standardization will leave the
consumer facing basis risk 351 as he attempts to determine the unique
amount of futures contracts necessary to achieve his specific financial
objectives. The basis risk is introduced because the consumer will
have requirements that are different from those specified in the stan-
dardized futures contract in regard to contract size, payment dates,
maturity, and cashflow payments.352 Indeed, the amount of basis risk
introduced by the futures contract could ultimately outweigh the in-
tended value of the contract. It is interesting to note that corporate
end-users of derivatives prefer privately negotiated derivatives rela-
tive to exchange-traded instruments by a significant margin. 3
347. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 172, at 470.
348. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 187.
349. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that the Chicago
exchanges exploited the benefits of standardization in order to offer an attractive
product that was different from privately negotiated derivatives).
350. See id. at 19-21.
351. Basis risk arises because the standardized terms of a futures contract do not
match the underlying financial transaction to be hedged. This may be due to the fact
that the asset whose price is to be hedged may not be exactly equal to the price of the
futures contract. Also, the contract dates of the futures may not coincide with the
execution, maturity, and payment dates of the underlying asset. Further, the underly-
ing index of the future could differ from that of the underlying asset. See Hull, supra
note 64, at 88-104.
352. See id.
353. See Treasury Management Ass'n, 1995 Derivatives Practices and Instruments
Survey: Final Results 6 (1995). A market survey of corporate derivatives use by the
Treasury Management Association, an industry association of individual treasury
managers, found that 72% of the respondents used privately negotiated instruments,
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Another onerous requirement of the CEA that would deter con-
sumers from using retail swaps if they were restructured as exchange
traded futures is the margin and daily settlement requirement of the
exchanges.354 To insure the integrity of the futures market, exchanges
require each party to post a performance bond known as initial mar-
gin, and then, through a daily mark-to-market process, post additional
margin (variation margin) in response to daily price movements.355
The process of making or receiving daily variation margin payments,
coupled with the posting of initial margin, will be inconvenient, costly,
and complex for most consumers.
There is great ambiguity over the definition of a futures contract.
To provide the greatest economic value, consumer swaps must avoid
being labeled a future. As dealers craft and develop these products,
they must emphasize their high degree of customization to deter the
CFTC from seizing upon the product. Labeling these highly valuable
retail transactions as futures and subjecting them to the exchange
trading requirement will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, their value to
consumers. In addition to having to comply with the complex and
costly margin requirements, individuals will not be able to structure
transactions to exactly match their portfolio objectives. Part V dis-
cusses why further regulation of retail derivatives is unnecessary de-
spite the presence of a product regulator such as the SEC or CFTC.
V. INCREASED REGULATION FOR RETAIL SWAPS Is UNNECESSARY
The SEC and CFTC do not have regulatory authority over the cur-
rent institutional swap market, nor should their authority apply when
swaps become available to the public. Once these product regulators
observe retail activity in privately negotiated derivatives, however, the
inevitable first response is to clamor for increased regulatory supervi-
sion through a derivatives policeman. Increased regulation is unwar-
ranted. The structure of retail derivatives and the nature of individual
investment decisions provide sufficient incentives to deter fraud and
whereas only 17% used exchange-traded products. See id. The survey respondents
reported that their preference for OTC instruments was due to their ability to selec-
tively match their exposure. See id. at 2, 6.
354. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1061-1114. Das provides a
thorough analysis of the complications of using futures contracts rather than a tai-
lored privately negotiated contract to hedge financial exposures. These include
among other things calculating the hedge, re-balancing the hedge in response to mar-
ket moves, managing the financing costs of the hedge ("tail risk"), maturity and pay-
ment date mismatches, basis risk, and margin costs. See id. Das states that
corporations usually have preferred to use privately negotiated derivatives over fu-
tures contracts. See i. at 1079. Corporations, in general, enter into privately negoti-
ated derivatives with financial institutions. The financial institutions that are
maintaining a portfolio of transactions and hedge their exposure at the margin, in turn
hedge their financial risk with futures contract in addition to other financial instru-
ments. See id.
355. See Kapner & Marshall, supra note 11, at 180.
1999] 3247
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
other manipulative sales practices. Increased regulation to police con-
sumer swaps will only lead to increased cost, and would perhaps ulti-
mately drive the activity offshore.
A. A Cost-Benefit Framework for Financial Regulation
It is constructive to address the purposes of financial regulation and
under what circumstances increased regulation is warranted. Accord-
ing to Roger Andersen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United
States Department of the Treasury, "[r]egulation can impose costs of
compliance, and, if those costs are not compensated for by the bene-
fits of compliance, then those costs can get passed on to Treasury and
the taxpayers. ' 3 56 Wendy Gramm, former CFTC chairman, identifies
three reasons for regulation of financial markets: "(1) providing for
adequate levels of customer and investor protection; (2) maintaining
market or price integrity; [and] (3) protecting the financial integrity of
the system." '357 In particular, government regulation is required only
when a market failure exists that prevents the industry from working
out a market-based or contractual solution to the problem. 358 The
former chairman states that the current regulatory structure is suffi-
cient for institutional activity because "both common law and statute
allow arm's-length contracts to be voided under certain instances in-
cluding willful deception, the failure to disclose material information,
and the possession of information that would give one party an 'un-
conscionable' bargaining advantage. ' 359 These remedies will also be
available for retail swap participants.
B. Structure Inherently Protects Against Fraud
Because privately negotiated derivatives, whether institutional or
retail, are bi-lateral contracts, "[d]ealers ... must regularly demon-
strate their integrity, reputations, and ability to honor long-term com-
mitments."360 Each counterparty assumes the counterparty risk of the
other. 6' Counterparty risk consists of two components: credit risk
(default risk) and the possibility that a counterparty will renege on
their contract.362
356. Roger L. Anderson, The Treasury Department's Role in Regulating the Deriva-
tives Marketplace, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 775, 778 (1997).
357. Wendy Lee Gramm & Gerald D. Gay, Ready-Fire-Aim: An Antidote to Deriv-
ative Regulation by Anecdote, in Derivatives Handbook: Risk Management and Con-
trol, supra note 8, at 433, 434.
358. See id. at 443.
359. Id. at 435.
360. See Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 82.
361. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 199.
362. See Romano, supra note 30, at 51-53. The credit risk of futures contacts is very
minute due to the clearinghouse mechanism (margin system) and is not that of any
underlying counterparty, but the exchange itself. See Gibson, supra note 2, at 542.
Indeed, futures exchanges were essentially thought to be without credit risk until the
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Because counterparty risk is inherent in the swap structure, a dealer
must have several strengths to be competitive in offering derivatives:
"a relatively strong credit standing, large relative capitalization, good
access to information about a variety of end-users, and relatively low
costs of managing the residual risks of an unmatched portfolio of cus-
tomers" entering into privately negotiated derivatives.363 These char-
acteristics preclude the possibility of retail participants transacting
among themselves. They do not have the credit rating, capitalization,
or the ability to match and offset transactions against each other. The
logical candidates to be involved are those already active in financial
activity-commercial and investment banks and non-bank financial
corporations such as insurance and trading affiliates. 364
Retail swap transactions will necessarily involve an institution such
as a commercial bank that is already involved in financial activity.36s
It is telling that even in the institutional derivatives market, the struc-
ture of having two institutional counterparties directly enter into swap
contracts with each other was quickly abandoned.-' Instead, institu-
tional end-users, rather than contracting directly with each other, con-
tract with a financial corporation, providing end-users with a
counterparty of acceptable credit risk and relief from the responsibil-
ity of making complex credit evaluations of other institutional partici-
pants.367 Retail end-users will seek out financial swap counterparties
as well. In fact, the incentive for individuals, rather than institutions,
to transact with counterparties with impeccable credit standing is even
stronger, because their own money is at stake.
An untarnished reputation is now essential for long run success as a
derivatives dealer: "Just like Caesar's wife, market participants in the
derivatives industry must be above reproach." 3" There is no doubt
that Bankers Trust's position as a premiere derivatives dealer crum-
bled in response to the publicity alleging that Bankers Trust had en-
gaged in sales practices resulting in significant losses to their
trading activity Nick Leeson on behalf of Barings Bank (Singapore office) on the
Singapore Monetary Exchange ("SIMEX") resulted in significant losses and fears for
the exchange's solvency. See Anatoli Kuprianov, Derivatives Debacles: Case Studies
of Large Losses in Derivatives Markets, in Derivatives Handbook: Risk Management
and Control, supra note 8, at 605, 617-19.
363. Culp, Primer on Derivatives, supra note 2, at 27.
364. See id.
365. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 197-98 (detailing several examples of
derivatives use by individuals in the future that all involve the individual transacting
with a financial institution and not another individual).
366. See Das, Swap Financing, supra note 14, at 34-35; see also 1 Das, Global Refer-
ence, supra note 35, at 26 ("As the variety of end-users on both sides of the market
increased, potential couterparties grew increasingly reluctant to accept the credit risk
involved.").
367. See 1 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 26.
368. Bradley D. Belt & George P. Stamas, The Intangibles: Political, Regulatory
and Reputational Risk, in An Introduction to VAR 3, 28 (Rod Beckstrom & Alyce
Campbell eds., 1995) [hereinafter Belt & Stamas, Introduction to VAR].
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counterparties such as Gibson Greetings and Proctor & Gamble. 69
As a consequence, swap dealers are now more aware than ever of the
importance of signaling their integrity and strong credit rating to the
market.370 For instance, J.P. Morgan now provides to the public its
own internally developed derivatives risk management technology,
Riskmetrics.37' J.P. Morgan released its method for calculating mar-
ket risk to increase transparency in the markets and to establish a
common standard for measuring risk. 372 Another example is the De-
rivatives Policy Group's publishing in March 1995 of Framework for
Voluntary Oversight of the OTC Derivatives Activities of Securities
Firms Affiliates to Promote Confidence and Stability in Financial Mar-
kets, which is the agreement of six investment banks to voluntarily
provide the CFTC and SEC reports of their derivatives operations. 373
And many banks and brokerage houses have established AAA sub-
sidiaries for the sole purpose of derivatives dealing.3 74 The AAA sub-
369. See Loomis, supra note 15, at 59-68. Loomis provides a detailed analysis of the
reputational harm and resulting business loss suffered by Bankers Trust as a result of
the alleged losses by Procter & Gamble and Gibson Greetings Cards. See id.
370. See Cohen, supra note 43, at 2028-29.
371. See Michael R. Sesit, Morgan Unveils the Way It Measures Market Risk, Wall
St. J., Oct 11, 1994, at C1. Sesit observes J.P. Morgan's release of proprietary infor-
mation as an aggressive effort to establish the standard by which financial institutions
and corporations measure risk. See id.
372. See id.
373. Derivatives Policy Group, Framework for Voluntary Oversight: A Framework
for Voluntary Oversight of the OTC Derivatives Activities of Securities Firms Affili-
ates to Promote Confidence and Stability in Financial Markets (Mar. 1995). The De-
rivatives Policy Group consists of six investment banks: CS First Boston, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers. The
group was established at the recommendation of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC.
See id. at 1. The group established management, reporting, capital, and counterparty
regulations. The firms voluntarily agreed to send compliance reports of these require-
ments to the SEC and CFTC. See id. at 2-3.
It has been suggested that the best approach to the regulatory conundrum of deriv-
atives would be an industry wide voluntary implementation of best practices. See
Thomas A. Russo, Self Regulation, Futures Industry, Feb./Mar., 1999, at 16, 16. "A
more appropriate approach to financial market 'regulation' is not regulation in the
traditional sense; rather, a comprehensive, voluntary initiative spanning national
boundaries and outdated distinctions among financial products and market partici-
pants presents the best answer to the regulatory quandary that has defied legal resolu-
tion." Id.
374. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1152. Credit ratings for the
AAA subsidiaries are analogous to bond ratings. For a description of Moody's and
Standard and Poor's bond ratings see Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Princi-
ples of Corporate Finance 664-65 (1996). The capital adequacy of a AAA derivatives
subsidiary also know as a Special Purpose Derivatives Vehicle (SPDV) is the essential
element that provides the subsidiary with a rating above that of its parent. See 2 Das,
Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1154. In addition, Moody's and Standard and
Poor's consider the proposed portfolio credit quality, counterparty credit risk, mana-
gerial and operating guidelines, and controls on the parent-subsidiary relationship.
See id. at 1153. The capital level required to be maintained by the AAA is calculated
by use of a risk model that estimates the effects of default and market risk on the
AAA subsidiary's portfolio. See id. at 1154.
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sidiary allows those dealers engaged in derivatives with less than a
AAA credit rating to establish a separate legal entity that will have a
AAA credit rating for purposes of its derivative business.37" The
AAA is granted by the rating agencies only after the subsidiaries' in-
dependence from the parent is established along with a showing of
high capitalization. 37 6 The incentives to provide reputational signals
to attract derivatives end-users will be just as prevalent for retail
swaps due to the omnipresent existence of couterparty risk.
C. Increased Regulation Will Drive Retail Activity Offshore
As Susan Phillips, a member of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, cautions, "The challenges of supervision in a
rapidly changing financial and technological environment actually are
compounded by global integration in the market place. To the extent
that regulation in one country is deemed too restrictive, firms can
avoid it by simply booking business in another country. '377 The ad-
vent of the Internet has significantly facilitated consumer access to
offshore markets.3 78 United States regulators need to tread cautiously
in the arena of retail derivatives to prevent the product's development
outside of the United States. Unfavorable regulation in the United
States has played a substantial role in moving profitable financial ac-
tivities offshore, including investments in Eurobonds,379 Brent oil con-
tracts, 80 and commodity swaps.38'
As discussed earlier, swaps came to the attention of the CFTC in
1987 primarily due to commodity swap activity.3s That year, the
CFTC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, an-
nouncing its intention to assert jurisdiction "over virtually all hybrid
375. See 2 Das, Global Reference, supra note 35, at 1152.
376. See id.
377. Susan M. Phillips, Keynote Address at the Derivatives and Risk Management
Symposium at Fordhan University School of Law (1997), reprinted in 66 Fordham L
Rev. 767, 773 (1997).
378. Prior to the development of financial transactions on the Internet, Merton
Miller noted that as derivatives markets operate telephonically, electronically, and by
computer, they are "extremely sensitive to political and financial developments
around the world and around the clock." McLauglin, supra note 78, at 195.
379. A eurobond is a bond that is sold by an international syndicate of underwriters
to foreign investors. The underwriters are located primarily in London, although
eurobonds may be sold throughout the world. See Brealey & Myers, supra note 374,
at 682.
380. See Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum, 738 F. Supp.
1472, 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (defining Brent oil as "a blend of oils produced in various
fields in the North Sea and delivered through pipelines for loading onto cargo ships at
Sullem Voe in the Shetland Islands."). One of the issues in Transnor was whether or
not the Brent oil market was an international or primarily United States market. See
id. The court held the Brent market to be a United States market. See id. at 1475-76.
381. See supra note 11.
382. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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instruments, with only limited exclusions or exemptions. . . . "383 Hy-
brids were defined as financial instruments that, although styled as a
security, had payment features economically equivalent to those of
commodity futures or options.3" The CFTC began investigative and
enforcement proceedings against the institutions that were beginning
to be involved in commodity swaps.385 The CFTC's actions halted the
development of commodity swaps in the United States, forcing United
States institutions to shift their activity to London and other financial
centers.386 The swap industry's reaction to this CFTC action was dra-
matic: "[t]he domestic commodity swap business ceased to exist as all
deals moved overseas and a 'firestorm of criticism' for the Commis-
sion's actions ensued. 387
One scholar asserts that the slower currency market growth rate in
recent years in the United States relative to the United Kingdom
could be caused by the legal uncertainty surrounding the interpreta-
tion of the Treasury Amendment's definitions of "in foreign currency"
and "board of trade." '388 The United Kingdom's currency market has
grown at a rate of sixty percent, while the United States grew at an
average rate of forty-six percent.38 9 Another possible reason for the
slower growth rate in the United States is market participants' fear
that foreign currency options, because they were transactions "involv-
ing" and not "in" foreign exchange, were not covered by the Treasury
Amendment, and were thus unenforceable. 390 Further, ambiguity re-
mains over the definition of "board of trade" in the Treasury Amend-
ment.39 1 A court within the Eastern District of New York construed
the term to include not only organized exchanges designated as com-
modity markets by the CFTC, but "any informal association of per-
sons engaged in the business of buying and selling" foreign
currency. 392 Thus, CFTC jurisdiction could be interpreted to extend
to all currency transactions, including those entered into by two insti-
tutions.393 Although the Supreme Court's decision in Dunn makes
383. McLauglin, supra note 2, at 139.
384. See id. at 139-40.
385. See id. at 140.
386. See id.
387. Tormey, supra note 125, at 2360.
388. See id. at 2342, 2352-56, 2359 n.300.
389. See id.
390. See id. at 2319.
391. See id. at 2353.
392. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV93-0088,
1993 WL 809966, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993).
393. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2320-21. "[T]he meaning of the term 'board of
trade' has become hopelessly tangled in the controversy over the meaning of the so-
called Treasury Amendment." Harris, supra note 203, at 1171. A narrow reading of
the term would limit the exchange trading requirement of organized exchanges. See
id. at 1172. A broad reading, however, where potentially transactions between two
individuals could be included, "would render the Treasury Amendment purposeless,
for virtually no transaction would escape CFTC jurisdiction." Id.
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clear that the Treasury Amendment applies to foreign currency op-
tions,394 it is plausible that the legal uncertainty surrounding currency
options in the past, coupled with the remaining uncertainty regarding
the definition of the board of trade, has curtailed the growth rate of
United States currency markets relative to the United Kingdom. 395
In 1990, the 15-day Brent oil contacts moved offshore in response
the Southern District of New York's holding in Transnor (Bermuda)
Ltd. v. BP North American Petroleum.9 The court found that the
contracts were futures, and therefore were regulated under the
CEA.397 The decision led many major oil companies to relocate their
oil trading operations overseas.398 Although the CFTC tried to
counter the offshore migration by issuing a statutory interpretation
that stated the contracts were not subject to the CEA regulation as
they fell within the CEA's "cash forward exclusion," 39 the ruling
came too late. The oil companies "never fully returned" to the United
States.4°
The development of the Eurobond (dollar denominated bonds is-
sued in Europe) market and the resulting outflow of capital from the
United States, is another example of a financial product migration due
to government-created costs.4" In the 1960s, the United States re-
quired foreign investors receiving interest from bonds purchased in
the United States to pay a thirty percent withholding tax.4(n The im-
position of this tax led to the establishment of London, not New York,
as the primary market for United States dollar bonds that are not sold
to United States citizens. 4 3 Even with the subsequent repeal of the
withholding tax, the market has remained overseas. 4
Banking regulators also introduced financial regulation that led to
profitable financial activity moving offshore.4 5 Due to the Federal
Reserve's Regulation Q, which capped the rate that United States
commercial banks could pay on time deposits pay for funds raised
through the acceptance of consumer time deposits, "much of the de-
posit-taking activity of U.S. money-center banks moved offshore. 40 6
The above examples of the movement offshore of United States fi-
nancial activity in response to government regulation indicate that
394. See Dunn v. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 913, 920-21
(1997).
395. See Tormey, supra note 125, at 2359 n.300.
396. 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
397. See id. at 1493.
398. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 195.
399. See id
400. Id.
401. See Belt & Stamas, Introduction to VAR, supra note 368, at 6 n.3.
402. See id
403. See id.
404. See id
405. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 34-35.
406. See id. at 35.
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regulators must use caution in regulating new financial instruments.
Historically, even when the United States regulators retracted offen-
sive regulation, in many cases the activity never fully returned.0 7
Congress should take especially careful note of the example provided
by Japan. Japan's current restrictive derivatives regulation has led
much of the activity to move offshore.408 The flow of transactions to
offshore dealers will ironically have the result of decreasing United
States regulatory oversight of the derivatives market.40 9
D. Retail Swaps Involve Asset Class Decisions
The types of swaps that consumers will be transacting will largely
involve an alteration of their portfolios between various asset classes.
Individuals will have the ability to swap among equity returns, fixed
income return, real estate returns, commodities returns, and so forth.
What is relevant to consumers in their decision-making process is in-
formation about past performances of asset classes, not individual
share information.410
Subjecting consumer derivatives to a regulator such as the SEC,
which mandates disclosure of material firm specific information con-
cerning the derivatives dealer, would only unnecessarily increase
costs-it would provide information that would be of marginal value
(if not irrelevant) to the consumer.41' Under historic disclosure rules,
entities are primarily required to provide firm-specific information.41 2
A corporation is required to provide specific price and dividend infor-
mation about its own stock.4 13 Reports concerning the overall per-
formance of common stocks, including aggregate risk and return
levels, are not required.41 4 Broad asset class information, such as pre-
dictions of future risks and returns, are not traditionally part of re-
quired disclosures.415
Individuals are concerned with future returns; firm-specific infor-
mation is only one part of the picture for those individuals who hold
shares in a mutual fund or other broad asset class. 41 6 With only firm-
specific information, individuals are left to fend for themselves as to
general performance predictions over the long term of specific asset
407. See supra notes 377-406 and accompanying text.
408. See Singher, supra note 174, at 1472 n.549.
409. See Wendy Lee Gramm, In Defense of Derivatives, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at
A12.
410. See generally Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention, supra note 193, at 2324-25 (dis-
cussing how current securities disclosure rules that emphasize issuer-specific informa-
tion has led to asset-class "illiteracy").
411. See id. at 2321-23.
412. See id. at 2322.
413. See id. at 2323.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. See id. at 2359-60.
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classes.41 7 Long-term analysis and projection are more likely to be
informative of future returns than individual, firm-specific
information.418
The SEC prevented firms from making projections in their disclo-
sure statements, as they were concerned that the projections might
potentially mislead unsophisticated investors. 19 The SEC regarded
the projections skeptically, as they were not hard facts, but simply
based on probability, and "paradoxically, investors were just as com-
petent to make projections." 4 ° In 1973, however, the SEC an-
nounced a change in its position concerning the disclosure of
probabilistic projections.42 As of 1978, the SEC has encouraged the
inclusion of registrant's projections in their SEC filings.4z2 Addition-
ally, the SEC issued Rule 175 under the '33 Act.4" This rule estab-
lishes a limited safe harbor for projections in SEC filings that are
made with a "reasonable basis" and in "good faith. '42 4 The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 extended the statutory safe
harbor to those companies that are subject to the continuous report-
ing requirements of the '34 Act.4  Even as the SEC has begun to
require future-oriented information, the safe harbors for such infor-
mation under Rule 175 and under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 still "focus on protecting predictions about the
entity, not about the trading price of the entity's security. 42 6
Similar disclosure rules exist for mutual funds, despite the fact that
an investment in the fund represents an interest in all of the fund's
assets.42 7 Nevertheless, the mandatory disclosure system for mutual
funds places greater importance on firm-specific information and "lit-
tle by way of probabilistic asset class information is required."' n
In the investment management process, asset class allocation deci-
sions are ultimately more important than market timing or individual
security selection in generating returns.429 In an analysis of ninety-
one large United States pension plans over the years 1974-1983,
"ninety-four percent of the variation in total plan return was ex-
417. See id. at 2360.
418. See id.
419. See id. at 2329.
420. Id.
421. See Cox, supra note 114, at 71.
422. See id
423. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (1996) (definition of "forward-looking statement" for
purposes of Rule 175 safe harbor).
424. See id.
425. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. II 1996) (definition of "forward-looking statement"
for purposes of the Act's safe harbor).
426. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention, supra note 193, at 2329.
427. See id. at 2358-59.
428. Id at 2359.
429. See hi. at 2362.
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plained solely by long-term allocation among asset classes ... 430
Indeed, "[s]ecurity selection, the choice of particular stocks and
bonds, was of only marginal relevance. 431
Increased responsibility is being placed on consumers to make asset
allocation decisions for at least two reasons. The first is the "dramatic
shift in the nature of pensions over the past two decades, from defined
benefit... plans to defined contribution... plans .... "432 Unlike a
defined benefit plan, under a defined contribution plan an individual
makes his own financial decisions.433 The second reason behind in-
creased individual financial responsibility is Social Security. As one
commentator has shrewdly observed, "[a]ccording to a recent poll,
more young people believe in the existence of UFO's than in the con-
tinuing ability of Social Security to provide for them in their old
age."43 Thus, individuals will be required to provide for retirement
themselves through pension plans and investment management.
With the advent of retail derivatives, consumers will gain greater
access to vital financial information due to swap dealers' self-interest.
As derivatives dealers compete for business, they will have the incen-
tive and capability to provide consumers with databases of informa-
tion on past asset class performance. Dealers will have to take care,
however, to offer the information in such a way that a later disgrun-
tled consumer can not claim reliance and sue the dealer should the
actual return fall short of past return.
As the swap market evolved, both the headline-grabbing losses of
1994 43 and the complexity felt to be behind the product induced
many, including Congress, to call for increased derivatives regulation
through suitability standards. 436 The concept of suitability emerged in
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 2365.
433. See id. at 2366.
434. Id.
435. In 1994, it was reported that losses by users of derivatives reached $10 billion.
See Adams & Runkle, supra note 19, at 1. In discussions of derivative losses, the
aggregate reports generally do not distinguish between whether the derivatives in-
volved were swaps, futures, or securities with embedded derivatives. Among the
most notable publicly reported or acknowledged losses of users of deriva-
tives include: Gibson Greetings ($23 million); Procter & Gamble ($157 mil-
lion); MG Corp., the [United States] subsidiary of Germany's
Metallgesellschaft AG ($1.5 billion); Dell Computer; Atlantic Richfield Co.
($22 million); Marion Merrell Dow ($11 to $14 million); Mead Corp. ($7.4
million); Paramount Communications ($20 million); Caterpillar's financial
services unit ($13.2 million); City Colleges of Chicago ($40 million); Odessa
College ($10 to $20 million); Escambia County, Florida ($19 million); Wis-
consin's investment fund ($95 million); and Orange County, California ($2
billion).
Id. at 1-2.
436. See Gibson, supra note 2, at 529-30.
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1938 through the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), which requires the following from its members:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the ba-
sis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
4 37
The New York Stock Exchange's "know your customer" rule, estab-
lished in 1960, requires its members to "use due diligence to learn the
essential facts relative to every customer [and] every order.' '4- It is
interesting to note that although the NASD and the major national
exchanges have suitability rules, the SEC does not.4 39 The CFTC also
does not have a suitability standard, and has stated that the "antifraud
provisions contained in the CEA do not impose a legal suitability obli-
gation on futures professionals."'  In 1993, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC") issued OCC Banking Circular 277,
Risk Management of Financial Derivatives."' Although the circular
required banks to determine whether a proposed derivative transac-
tion is appropriate for a customer, the OCC, in an interpretive release,
stated that it was not a suitability standard." 2 The guidelines were not
issued to protect the customer, but rather to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banks' derivatives business and ultimately, the
banks, themselves." 3
Adopting suitability standards to protect consumers entering into
retail swaps is unnecessary. First, suitability is generally undefinable,
and, "[like beauty ... is often in the eye of the beholder.""' 4 Second,
suitability requirements would encroach upon the privacy of custom-
ers' financial affairs.445 Third, the cost of providing all of the informa-
tion necessary for a derivatives dealer to determine if a swap is
suitable for an individual might increase costs to once again make the
437. Walter C. Greenough, The Limits of the Suitability Doctrine in Commodity
Futures Trading, 47 Bus. Law. 991, 993-94 (1992) (quoting NASD Rules of Capital
Fair Practice, art. III, § 2 (a), NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2152, at 2051).
438. Id at 994 (alteration in original).
439. Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anynore: The
Inadequacy of the Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 Fordham L
Rev. 97, 108 (1995).
440. Id. at 103.
441. See Belt & Stamas, Introduction to VAR, supra note 368, at 16 n.29.
442. See Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management of Financial Derivatives
(1993); Gibson, supra note 2, at 567-68.
443. See id at 569.
444. Greenough, supra note 437, at 993; see also id. at 1006 ("Is someone with a
large net worth and a proclivity for gambling less 'suitable' than someone who is less
wealthy but more controlled?").
445. See id. at 1007-08.
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product prohibitive at the retail level." 6 Fourth, a suitability doctrine
would encourage unwarranted litigation: "Unscrupulous customers
would try to recover their [derivatives] losses by claiming that they
never should have been allowed to trade." '447 Ultimately, because a
suitability doctrine imposes a duty on a dealer to refuse to transact
certain trades, it places the customer in a no-lose situation:
If the broker refuses to execute a trade that turns out to have been
profitable, the customer will point to the profitability of the trade as
evidence of its suitability and sue the broker for failing to follow her
orders. On the other hand, if the broker executes an order that re-
suits in a loss, the customer will claim that the broker should have
rejected the order because of its obvious (in hindsight)
unsuitability.448
The judicial system protects consumers by providing an adequate
forum for consumers to seek redress for any "losses resulting from
fraudulent sales practices., 449 Legal action and/or the threat of legal
action serve as a means of both preventing and deterring dealer mis-
conduct. 450 And, as stated by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Green-
span, the most powerful incentive a swap dealer has to avoid
fraudulent practices is the "fear of loss of the dealer's good reputa-
tion, without which it cannot compete effectively."'451
E. A Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives
A recent holding by an Indiana appellate court suggests that trust-
ees "may now have a duty to understand uses of derivatives to achieve
the most appropriate mix of risk and return for their beneficiaries, and
to use derivatives when they offer the best means of achieving that
mix."' 452 In Brane v. Roth,4 53 directors of a rural grain elevator coop-
erative ("Co-op") were sued by their shareholders for failing to effec-
tively hedge the Co-op's exposure to grain prices. 454 Ninety percent
of the Co-op's business was buying and selling grain.455 The profits of
the Co-op had fallen continuously from 1977.456 After a substantial
446. See id. (detailing that the costs of monitoring the consumer's financial and
emotional suitability would be passed onto the consumer, regardless of whether he
wanted the service).
447. Id. at 1008.
448. Id.
449. Gibson, supra note 2, at 581.
450. See id.
451. Id. at 581 n.346.
452. George Crawford, A Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives?, 1 Stan. J. L. Bus. &
Fin., 307, 307 (1995).
453. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). The derivative instru-
ments involved in Brane are exchange-traded futures, and not privately negotiated
derivatives. See supra notes 41-84 and accompanying text.
454. See Brane, 590 N.E.2d at 589.
455. See id.
456. See id.
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loss in 1979, the Co-op's accountant recommended hedging in the
grain futures market.457
The Co-op's directors approved the accountant's recommendation
and authorized an inexperienced manager to hedge for the Co-op.458
Of the Co-op's $7,300,000 in grain sales, only $20,050 was hedged.45 9
The lower court held and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the cor-
porate directors were liable for the losses, because the losses stemmed
from the inadequate hedging program.4 6 The court ruled that the di-
rectors breached their duty by: (1) retaining an inexperienced man-
ager; (2) failing to reasonably supervise the manager; (3) failing to
become aware of the essentials of hedging to be able to monitor the
activity; and (4) being grossly inattentive.46'
Some involved in the industry interpret Brane as going even beyond
suggesting that trustees may have a duty to understand derivatives
and incorporate them when appropriate in managing their benefi-
ciaries' portfolios.46z For example, ISDA's outside counsel states that
"the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the failure to hedge consti-
tuted a breach of the fiduciary duty of care" owed by the Co-op's
directors to its shareholders.463 Further, a former CFTC Chairman,
Philip McBride Johnson, questions whether "we are moving to a time
when failing to hedge may become a fundamental management flaw
and if there might eventually evolve a concept of per se (or automatic)
liability whenever unwanted risks that can be avoided are not prop-
erly hedged."4'
CONCLUSION
"Derivatives are here to stay."" 5 At the institutional level, deriva-
tives markets exist for all major currencies and for a significant por-
tion of the more domestic currencies. Swaps exist not only for
currency, interest rate, equity, and commodity indexes, but for such
457. See id
458. See id.
459. See id
460. See id
461. See id. at 589-91.
462. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 469-70.
463. See id at 470 (quoting Daniel P. Cunningham, Do Corporations Have a Duty
to Hedge? Brane v. Roth and In re Compaq, in Smithson et al., Managing Financial
Risk 67, 67-70 (1995)).
464. Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 16, at 1016 & n.143. But see McLaugh-
lin, supra note 2, at 470 (criticizing a broad interpretation of Brane's holding).
McLauglin disagrees that the Brane holding supports a proposition that managers and
directors, or even trustees have a duty to hedge. He suggests that the case only im-
plies that: (1) management must understand the fundamentals of a hedging product
and for what use it is intended before making a decision to use that product; and (2)
management must oversee the actual implementation of the hedging product to en-
sure that it is being used as intended. See id. at 472.
465. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 5, at 195.
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indexes as far-ranging as earthquakes and hurricanes (disaster deriva-
tives), Gross National Product (macro swaps), and art.466 The next
frontier is the consumer. Swaps are simply too powerful a risk man-
agement tool to be denied to consumers, now that cost is no longer a
prohibitive factor.
As swaps enter the retail phase of development, no further regula-
tion is necessary. Counterparty risk, inherent in swap transactions,
will mandate that retail participants do not enter into transactions di-
rectly with each other. Consumers, acting in their own self-interest,
will rationally transact with financial institutions that have the greatest
capital and strongest credit rating. Further, while financial theorists
debate about whether corporations should engage in derivative trans-
actions to hedge their financial risks because investors can simply di-
versify away unwanted risks, it is undisputed in financial theory that
individuals should hedge.46 7 Increased regulation of swaps would in-
crease costs, thus either greatly restricting or prohibiting desired risk-
reducing, economic-maximizing behavior. Regulation must not inter-
fere with the inevitable trend of widespread use of retail swap activity
through the Internet and elsewhere. Indeed, it is not difficult to envi-
sion a world where family financial managers, who have the responsi-
bility of providing the necessary funds to send their children to
college, will have a fiduciary duty to use derivatives to manage the risk
of their portfolios. Have you hedged today?
466. See 2 Das, Global Reverence, supra note 35, at 1444-45. An interesting idea
for a macro swap is discussed by John F. Marshall, Derivatives and Risk Management,
in The New Tool Set: Assessing Innovations in Banking 1995, at 79, 83-84. He sug-
gests that the use of macro swaps could ultimately aid in balancing the United States
budget. The Treasury could enter into Gross National Product linked swaps to immu-
nize revenues or even enhance revenues during a recession. See id. at 84.
467. In fact, individual investor hedging is the base foundation for the modern fi-
nancial theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model. See Brealey & Meyers, supra note
374, at 153-65.
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